



Toward a Sociology of Heresy, Orthodoxy, and Doxa

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Jacques Berlinerblau

TOWARD A SOCIOLOGY
OF HERESY, ORTHODOXY,
AND *Doxa*

One of the commonest totems is the belief about everything that exists, that it is “natural” that it should exist, that it could not do otherwise than exist, and that however badly one’s attempts at reform may go they will not stop life going on, since the traditional forces will continue to operate and precisely will keep life going on. (ANTONIO GRAMSCI, “The Modern Prince”)

Orthodoxy, straight, or rather *straightened* opinion, which aims, without ever entirely succeeding, at restoring the primal state of innocence of doxa, exists only in the objective relationship which opposes it to heterodoxy, that is, by reference to the choice-*hairesis*, heresy-made possible by the existence of *competing possibilities* and the explicit critique of the sum total of the alternatives not chosen that the established order implies. It is defined as a system of euphemisms, of acceptable ways of thinking and speaking the natural and social world, which rejects heretical remarks as blasphemies. (PIERRE BOURDIEU, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*)

A review of the relevant scholarly literature in religious studies reveals that there exists an immense—and growing—body of empirical research devoted to the subject of heresy. Studies investigating particular heretical movements dispersed across Christian time and space easily number in

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the hundreds. In recent years examinations of this subject within Judaism, Islam, and various Eastern religions have also appeared.¹ Most of the aforementioned investigations have been conducted by either historians or theologians, and, not surprisingly, they typically employ the vast array of methods associated with these capacious disciplines. What is often missing in these studies, however, is any type of theoretical statement as to what heresy is or how it might be viewed through the optic of major traditions in social theory.² In the absence of such statements, work in this area tends to be undergirded by implicit, unquestioned, and sometimes problematic assumptions about the nature of heresy.

In order to make these theoretical assumptions explicit, it might be suggested that scholars of religion simply consult the writings of sociologists on the subject of heresy. Yet the discipline of modern sociology itself, some have alleged, has shown little interest in this subject. George Zito argued in "Toward a Sociology of Heresy" that "a discussion of heresy has generally been neglected in the sociological literature."³ Lester Kurtz, in his article "The Politics of Heresy," averred that this topic was "little understood" and "virtually ignored" by sociologists.⁴ Zito and Kurtz are certainly correct in noting that social theorists have seldom engaged the problematic of heresy in any sustained manner. Their own important contributions have done much to rectify this shortcoming. Be that as it may, their claims need to be qualified somewhat.

¹ Edward Peters's *Heresy and Authority in Medieval Europe: Documents in Translation* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1980) expertly charts the development of thought on heresy across more than a millennium of Christian history. On the proliferation of heresy research see P. Henry, "Why Is Contemporary Scholarship So Enamored of Ancient Heretics?" (*Studia Patristica* 17 [1982]: 123–26). As Elisheva Carlebach has noted (*The Pursuit of Heresy: Rabbi Moses Hagiz and the Sabbatai Controversies* [New York: Columbia University Press, 1990], p. 15), resources for the study of Jewish heresy have increased greatly since the groundbreaking research of Gershom Scholem on the seventeenth-century heretic, Sabbatai Sevi (*Sabbatai Sevi: The Mystical Messiah, 1626–1676*, trans. R. J. Zwi Werblowsky [Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1973]). See Marc Saperstein's edited volume *Essential Papers on Messianic Movements and Personalities in Jewish History* (New York: New York University Press, 1992) for further discussions of Jewish Messianism. Steven Wasserstrom's recent study (*Between Muslim and Jew: The Problem of Symbiosis under Early Islam* [Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995]) is essential for the examination of heresy in early Islam. The possibilities of comparative study of heresy were briefly suggested by the sociologist of religion Joachim Wach (*Sociology of Religion* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957], pp. 172–73), though to the best of my knowledge no sociologist has attempted such a project. In 1998, however, historian John Henderson published what might be the first truly comparative study in this area, *The Construction of Orthodoxy and Heresy: Neo-Confucian, Islamic, Jewish and Early Christian Patterns* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998).

² Though Jeffrey Russell's documentary collection *Religious Dissent in the Middle Ages* (New York: Wiley, 1971) features an interesting section that samples Marxist and idealist approaches to the question of heresy and religious dissent.

³ George Zito, "Toward a Sociology of Heresy," *Sociological Analysis* 44 (1983): 123.

⁴ Lester Kurtz, "The Politics of Heresy," *American Journal of Sociology* 88 (1983): 1085, 1086.

Theorists of the classical generation (e.g., Friedrich Engels, Émile Durkheim, Max Weber, Georg Simmel, Antonio Gramsci) did, in fact, make brief and sporadic references to heresy.⁵ Only a few of these were noted by Zito and Kurtz, even though all provided intriguing leads for the study of this subject. In other instances, we find that the classical writers' short discussions of heresy, once placed within the larger framework of their thought, equip us with useful and coherent paradigms for future research. Thus, while there exists a variety of resources for the sociological study of heresy, neither scholars of religion nor sociologists have availed themselves of this body of work.

In the fifteen years since Zito's call for a "sociology of heresy" a few more resources have trickled forth. S. N. Eisenstadt and Randall Collins extrapolated from Weber's pithy remarks on the subject of heterodoxy.⁶ At the same time, the concept of heresy experienced something akin to a "secularization" process. Social scientists began to speak of heresy in academic fields,⁷ in scientific disputes,⁸ in the medical profession,⁹ in "twentieth century Marxism,"¹⁰ or as essentially "a semiotic or linguistic

⁵ A few of these references were very briefly noted by Zito and Kurtz, yet no effort was made to set these within the larger framework of any given theorist's writing. Both mentioned the affinity between the study of heresy and the Durkheimian sociology of deviance (Zito, p. 125; Kurtz, p. 1087, n. 3), but neither elaborated upon these correspondences or other possibilities (and dilemmas) raised by this school of thought. Consequently, the insights of the founding theorists remain to be assessed. Sociologically oriented studies of heresy, though with greater concentration on empirical data rather than theoretical concerns, can be seen in Bronislaw Geremek, "Mouvements hérétiques et déracinement social au bas moyen âge," *Annales* 37 (1982): 186–92; Malcolm Bull, "The Seventh-Day Adventists: Heretics of American Civil Religion," *Sociological Analysis* 50 (1989): 177–87; and Tommaso La Rocca, "Religion et société: Hypothèse de relecture des mouvements hérétiques," *Social Compass* 42 (1995): 109–19.

⁶ See S. N. Eisenstadt, "Dissent, Heterodoxy and Civilizational Dynamics: Some Analytical and Comparative Indications," in *Orthodoxy, Heterodoxy and Dissent in India*, ed. S. N. Eisenstadt, R. Kahane, and D. Shulman (Berlin: Mouton, 1984), pp. 1–9. Also see Randall Collins, *Weberian Sociological Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 213–46.

⁷ Pierre Bourdieu, *Homo Academicus*, trans. P. Collier (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1988); Charles Hirschkind, "Heresy or Hermeneutics: The Case of Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd," *American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences* 12 (1995): 463–77; Jacques Berlinerblau, *Heresy in the University: The Black Athena Controversy and the Responsibilities of American Intellectuals* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1999).

⁸ Pierre Bourdieu, "The Specificity of the Scientific Field," in *French Sociology: Rupture and Renewal since 1968*, ed. C. Lemert (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), pp. 257–92; Thomas Lessl, "Heresy, Orthodoxy, and the Politics of Science," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 74 (1988): 18–34.

⁹ Paul Wolpe, "The Holistic Heresy: Strategies of Ideological Challenge in the Medical Profession," *Social Science and Medicine* 31 (1990): 913–23, and "The Dynamics of Heresy in a Profession," *Social Science and Medicine* 39 (1994): 1133–48; also see Akile Gürsoy, "Beyond the Orthodox: Heresy in Medicine and the Social Sciences from a Cross-Cultural Perspective," *Social Science and Medicine* 43 (1996): 577–99; Vuk Stambolovic, "Medical Heresy—the View of a Heretic," *Social Science and Medicine* 43 (1996): 601–4.

¹⁰ Collins, p. 245.

phenomenon."¹¹ It was also during this period that Pierre Bourdieu developed, in bits and pieces, his intriguing, albeit not unproblematic, tripartite schema of heterodoxy/orthodoxy/*doxa*.¹²

By weaving together the stray threads of speculation about heresy, scattered across the grid of late nineteenth- and twentieth-century social theory, the present inquiry will attempt to identify some basic principles for the sociological study of this issue. This will help us to make explicit a variety of implicit assumptions held by the historians and theologians who study heresy. For the most part, these assumptions are distilled variants of basic principles found in the writings of Marx, Weber, and Gramsci. Also to be discussed are traditions within sociological thought, particularly Durkheimian sociology, which exert neither an implicit nor explicit influence on heresy research. These Durkheimian initiatives are representative of "objectivist" strands of inquiry in social theory, and it will be argued that they must be (at the very least) confronted by researchers who wish to engage in theoretically informed and balanced studies of heresy. Bourdieu's discussions of *doxa*, although somewhat obscure, go a long way in synthesizing these divergent "subjectivist" and "objectivist" traditions.

This article is, admittedly and unapologetically, a purely theoretical statement. Hopefully, it will provide scholars of religion with a variety of theoretical reference points by which they may structure their empirical inquiries. Ideally, this contribution will serve not only as a theoretical supplement to the explosion of research devoted to particular heresies, heretics, and orthodoxies, but as a synthesis itself—a preliminary statement as to what sociology teaches us about heresy and how it might be studied.

THREE PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS

RELATIONAL SOCIOLOGY

Prior to turning to the writings of specific social theorists, I will begin by stating three seemingly banal ground rules for the study of heresy. Some of these rules have already been independently identified by nonsociologists, while others remain sequestered within the more remote provinces of sociological thought. Each rule has achieved the status of a methodological axiom, though not all are entirely free of ambiguities.

First, heresy can only be understood in relation to orthodoxy. Gordon Leff writes, "Heresy is defined in reference to orthodoxy. It does not exist alone. A doctrine or sect or an individual becomes heretical when condemned as such by the church."¹³ Malcolm Lambert opines, "it takes two to

¹¹ Zito, p. 124.

¹² See citations of Bourdieu's work below for his references to heresy, orthodoxy, and *doxa*.

¹³ Gordon Leff, *Heresy in the Later Middle Ages: The Relation of Heterodoxy to Dissent: c. 1250–1450* (New York: Manchester University Press, 1967), 1:1.

create a heresy; the heretic, with his dissident beliefs and practices; and the Church, to condemn his views and to define what is orthodox doctrine.”¹⁴ This approach is consonant with the basic assumptions of “relational sociology.” The latter, according to Mustafa Emirbayer, “sees relations between terms or units as preeminently dynamic in nature, as unfolding, ongoing processes rather than as static ties among inert substances.”¹⁵

The use of the relational method has significant implications for any scholar who wishes to define the term “heresy.” For we cannot assume that heresy has a fixed, immutable, ahistorical essence. Accordingly, the definition of heresy cannot be predicated on its contents. One should not, then, try to define heresy as something associated with magical rituals, a particular eschatological stance, a tendency toward apocalyptic world-views, and so on. It cannot be said that any particular beliefs, rites, and practices are the recurring hallmark of the heretical—even the most cursory comparison of empirical studies of heresy would indicate that these vary greatly in time and space.

Instead, we should define heresy in terms of its structural position vis-à-vis orthodoxy. The following well-known passage from Kai Erikson’s *Wayward Puritans: A Study in the Sociology of Deviance* is instructive in demonstrating how heresy may be defined structurally: “Deviance is not a property *inherent* in any particular kind of behavior; it is a property *conferred upon* that behavior by the people who come into direct or indirect contact with it. The only way an observer can tell whether or not a given style of behavior is deviant, then, is to learn something about the standards of the audience which responds to it.”¹⁶ If the reader substitutes the word “heresy” for “deviance” and “orthodoxy” for “audience,” then this comment will illustrate the relational approach (and the lines

¹⁴ Malcolm Lambert, *Medieval Heresy: Popular Movements from the Gregorian Reform to the Reformation* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), pp. 4–5. Also see Kurtz (n. 2 above), pp. 1098, 1110; Zito (n. 3 above), p. 125; and Jacques Berlinerblau, *The Vow and the ‘Popular Religious Groups’ of Ancient Israel: A Philological and Sociological Inquiry* (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1996), pp. 22–24.

¹⁵ Mustafa Emirbayer, “Manifesto for a Relational Sociology,” *American Journal of Sociology* 103 (1997): 289; also see Pierre Bourdieu and L. J. D. Wacquant, *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992). The relational approach applies in all areas of religious research. See, e.g., William Swatos, Jr., and Kevin Christiano on the definition of *secularization* in “Secularization Theory: The Course of a Concept,” *Sociology of Religion* 60 (1999): 209–28.

¹⁶ Kai Erikson, *Wayward Puritans: A Study in the Sociology of Deviance* (New York: Wiley, 1966), p. 6; also see Émile Durkheim, *The Rules of Sociological Method*, trans. S. Solovay and J. Mueller (New York: Free Press, 1966), p. 70. For a discussion of some of the practices and beliefs which do seem to be inherent to “popular religion,” or at least the academic discourse on “popular religion” see Jacques Berlinerblau, “Max Weber’s Useful Ambiguities and the Problem of Defining ‘Popular Religion,’” *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* (2001), in press.

of correspondence between the sociologies of deviance and heresy). Put simply (and tautologically), heresy is something that an orthodoxy calls heresy.¹⁷ As we shall see momentarily, the latter is also something that stands in a particular political relation with the former.

Ostensibly, the relational approach is saturated with a variety of relativizing implications. Seen through this optic, orthodoxy is not—as the orthodox would always have it—in singular possession of an invariable “truth.” Rather, its contents are to be construed as fluid, as developing in a dialectic with heterodoxy. Orthodoxy develops, remarks John Henderson, by “constructing an inversion of the heretical other.”¹⁸ Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann observe that orthodoxies grapple with, and eventually incorporate, deviant beliefs into their theological frame of reference, so as to neutralize them.¹⁹ And Weber affirms: “In the case of the Vedas the scriptural cannon was established in opposition to intellectual heterodoxy.”²⁰ We might conclude—slightly adapting a phrase from George Herbert Mead—that orthodoxy is what it is, through its relationship to heterodoxy, and vice versa.²¹

The orthodox, it goes without saying, do not generally subscribe to this view. The acceptance of the relational approach by modern historiography essentially marks the divide between the ancient Christian and Muslim sciences of heresiology and the modern academic study of heresy. Unlike the heresiologist of yesterday, the student of heresy need not stigmatize the heretic nor extol the inquisitor (problematically, in fact, we shall see that the very opposite has occurred in contemporary research).²²

¹⁷ Jack Gibbs has discussed the tautological demeanor that these assumptions lend to the sociology of deviance in his “Conceptions of Deviant Behavior: The Old and the New,” *Pacific Sociological Review* 9 (1966): 9–14.

¹⁸ Henderson (n. 1 above), p. 2.

¹⁹ Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge* (New York: Anchor, 1967), pp. 115–16; also see Kurtz, p. 1085.

²⁰ Max Weber, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, vols. 1 and 2, ed. G. Roth and C. Wittich (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 1:459.

²¹ Mead originally wrote, “We are what we are through our relationship to others”; see George Herbert Mead, *Mind, Self, and Society: From the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 379. Bourdieu makes the interesting point that in the face of heresy “the production of canonical writings accelerates when the content of the tradition is itself threatened” in Pierre Bourdieu, “Genesis and Structure of the Religious Field,” *Comparative Social Research* 13 (1991): 30.

²² This less dogmatic orientation has deep roots within an intellectual tradition that urged its practitioners to “study moral facts objectively and to speak of them in a different language from that of the layman” (Durkheim, *The Rules*, p. 72, n. 13). This endeavor to transvalue putatively negative phenomena (e.g., crime, suicide) is of no small relevance to the development of modern discourses on heresy. See Henderson, pp. 1–2, for a discussion of the terms heresiography and heresiology.

HERESY IN TIME AND SPACE: SOCIOLOGICAL PRECONDITIONS

In order to be a legitimate object of sociological scrutiny, the pairing of heterodoxy and orthodoxy must be a phenomenon that may be identified across different times and places. In other words, if this nexus were not a recurring phenomenon, it would be pointless to develop something like a sociological theory, or better yet an “ideal-type,” to describe its most general features. As an aggregate, historians and theologians who study this topic seem to confirm that heresy/orthodoxy is a relation that can be identified in manifold historical contexts.

John Henderson introduces his important comparative study with the words “For most of the past two thousand years in the history of Western, Middle Eastern, and even Chinese civilizations, the primary form of deviance and expression of dissent was religious heresy.”²³ Kurtz casts the net even wider noting that “heresy has long been an integral part of religious life in *all* of the world’s cultures.”²⁴ But does it follow that heresy is a “parallel variation” or “form” witnessed in societies of all types?²⁵ A variety of theoretical perspectives would lead us to respond in the negative. Even Durkheim, a tireless champion of sociology’s comparative scope, would be hard-pressed to find the heretical in a society characterized by what he labeled “mechanical solidarity.”²⁶ The possibility of heretical dissent is rendered unlikely by the theoretical proposition that “the individual consciousness . . . is simply a dependency of the collective type, and follows all its motions.”²⁷ Under such hypothetical circumstances, the pronounced differences in opinion that characterize the heresy/orthodoxy nexus cannot exist.

Whereas this approach casts doubts on the existence of heresy in so-called primitive societies, others question its place in modern ones. For Peter Berger, the existence of the heretical in contemporary times is problematic insofar as modernity itself is predicated on the heretical ethos. While constraint on “choice” (*hairesis*) was the precondition for the heretical in early Christianity, modernity makes choice the currency of all social existence. “The heretical imperative,” Berger alleges, “[is] a root phenomenon of modernity . . . heresy, once the occupation of marginal

²³ Henderson, p. 1.

²⁴ Emphasis mine; Kurtz (n. 2 above), p. 1091.

²⁵ Émile Durkheim, *Emile Durkheim on Institutional Analysis*, ed. and trans. Mark Traugott (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), p. 86.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 77, 86, *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, trans. Karen Fields (New York: Free Press, 1995), p. 4, and *The Division of Labor in Society*, trans. W. D. Halls (New York: Free Press, 1984), pp. 31–67. With much assurance, though with little consistency, Durkheim insists that we should only compare societies of the same type (*Elementary Forms*, p. 93). Problematically, his work freely drew comparisons across societies of many different types.

²⁷ Durkheim, *Emile Durkheim*, p. 84.

and eccentric types, has become a much more general condition; indeed, heresy has become universalized.”²⁸

All of this points to the importance of identifying some fundamental sociological criteria to account for where the heresy/orthodoxy nexus can be said to exist. To this end, theorists have made a variety of suggestions, some more useful than others. Berger maintains that heresy “presupposed the authority of a religious tradition.”²⁹ Collins, paralleling Weber’s definition of a church, emphasizes that “a particular type of religious *and* political organization” evokes the heretical.³⁰ In another Weberian analysis, Hamid Dabashi suggests that “it is the political success of a given interpretive reading that renders a religious position ‘orthodox.’”³¹ Others stress the importance of a written tradition.³²

Zito peels off the exclusively religious connotation of heresy seen in the definitions of Collins and Berger. For him, heresy “is not, strictly speaking, a religious phenomenon, but an institutional phenomenon. It arose first within religion only because of the religious institution’s central position in governing the discourses of a particular historical moment.”³³ What is attractive in Zito’s proposal is that it sees the relation of heresy and orthodoxy as not restricted to religion but germane to manifold departments of human interaction. Provisionally, I will retain the more pliant definition of heresy advocated by Zito and fuse it with Collins’s and Dabashi’s emphasis on the political nature of orthodoxy. In order for heresy to “arise” there must exist an authoritative political apparatus (i.e., an orthodoxy), one capable of identifying heretics and effectively “manag-

²⁸ Peter L. Berger, *The Heretical Imperative: Contemporary Possibilities of Religious Affirmation* (New York: Anchor, 1979), pp. 30–31; also see Stambolovic (n. 9 above), p. 601.

²⁹ Berger, *The Heretical*, p. 27.

³⁰ Collins (n. 6 above), p. 218. I concur only with the second half of this equation. The religious criteria mentioned by Collins are not convincing. In his view, the heretical arises under conditions of “aggressive monotheism” evinced by a “universalistic church” (pp. 217, 218, 222). The remark of Henderson is instructive here: “heresy is not such a fragile hot-house plant that it requires the services of a monotheistic doctrine, a central ecclesiastical authority, an inquisition, or even a creed. Neo-Confucianism in China lacked all of the above and yet developed notions of heresy and orthodoxy” (n. 1 above), pp. 7, 5; contra Collins, p. 221. Collins closely follows Weber’s definition of church when defining heresy. He points out that in social bodies based on kinship structures heresy is not possible (p. 216; see Weber, *Economy and Society* [n. 20 above], p. 1164, and see p. 56). He also calls attention to the need for literacy, records, communications, and “a ritual focus of loyalty around rules and sacred books rather than individual persons” (p. 221). Eisenstadt (n. 6 above), p. 3, following Karl Jaspers, identifies orthodoxies only in those societies where there exists “a basic tension between the transcendental and mundane worlds.” For a discussion of Weber’s conception of the church, see Pierre Bourdieu, “Legitimation and Structured Interests in Weber’s Sociology of Religion,” in *Max Weber, Rationality and Modernity*, ed. S. Lash and S. Whimster (London: Allen & Unwin, 1987), p. 132.

³¹ Hamid Dabashi, *Authority in Islam: From the Rise of Muhammad to the Establishment of the Umayyads* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1989), p. 71.

³² See Wach (n. 1 above), p. 143; Collins, p. 221; Henderson, p. 7.

³³ Zito (n. 3 above), p. 126.

ing” them.³⁴ Below we will elaborate upon this remark as we conscript Gramsci’s notion of hegemony and Weber’s conceptualization of legitimate domination in our effort to define orthodoxy (and thus heresy).

THE STRUCTURAL POSITION OF THE HERETIC

What makes the heretic an especially engrossing subject for sociological scrutiny is the unique structural position which he or she occupies. As Lewis Coser observed in *The Functions of Social Conflict*, “by upholding the group’s central values and goals, he threatens to split it into factions that will differ as to the means for implementing its goal. Unlike the apostate, the heretic claims to uphold the group’s values and interests, only proposing different means to this end or variant interpretations of the official creed. . . . The heretic proposes alternatives where the group wants no alternative to exist. . . . In this respect, the heretic calls forth all the more hostility in that he still has much in common with his former fellow-members in sharing their goals.”³⁵

The subversive power of the heretic is predicated on the fact that she or he is “one of us.” This is nicely expressed by Origen’s claim that “All heretics at first are believers; then later they swerve from the rule of faith.”³⁶ Kurtz, following Simmel’s discussions of “the stranger,” speaks of the heretic as “an intense union of both nearness and remoteness” and “a deviant insider.”³⁷ He goes on to observe that “Heretics are within the circle, or within the institution.”³⁸ For Zito, the heretic “employs *the same language* as the parent group, retains its values, but attempts to order its discourse to some other end.”³⁹

There is, however, an important—and to this point neglected—question raised by this approach. All agree that a heretic is an insider, but by what specific criteria may we come to such a conclusion? Coser (and Origen) share the assumption that the heretic’s insideness is predicated upon holding certain beliefs and values (i.e., orthodox beliefs) from which he or she eventually deviates. Kurtz, by contrast, seems to posit an institutional basis for the heretic’s insider status (though his reference to a “circle” also suggests membership in an elite group). Zito invokes the notion of a common discursive universe.

³⁴ Whether this political apparatus is comprised of worshipers of a particular God or adherents to a particular scholarly theory is actually a secondary concern for the sociologist of heresy, though not, perhaps, for the scholar of religion.

³⁵ Lewis Coser, *The Functions of Social Conflict* (New York: Free Press, 1964), p. 70; also see Kurtz (n. 2 above), p. 1096.

³⁶ Quoted in Walter Bauer, *Orthodoxy and Heresy in Earliest Christianity*, 2d ed. (Mifflintown, Pa.: Sigler, 1971), p. xxiii.

³⁷ Kurtz, p. 1087.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 1087, and see p. 1088.

³⁹ Zito, p. 125; also see Wach, pp. 172–73.

So is inside status a function of a shared ideological orientation? Membership in an institution? Common language? Discursive orientation? All of the above? Are class, gender, and ethnicity also components of a codetermined, multivariable, insider status? Insofar as all agree that a heretic is an insider, a major task for the sociology of heresy consists of advancing a more precise conception of insider status. Various solutions to this problem will be presented below.

THEORIZING ORTHODOXY: THE HARD VERSION

Having stated our three basic ground rules, we now turn to the writings of various social theorists on the subject of heresy/orthodoxy. The approaches to be discussed in this section surface, in simplified form, in much heresy research conducted by scholars of religion.

In *A Letter Concerning Toleration* John Locke made the ingenious observation that “every one is Orthodox to himself.”⁴⁰ Be that as it may, the objective fact remains that only one group (or coalition of groups) within a social body can behave like an orthodoxy in word and deed. This means that it must retain the capacity to label others as heretics—and make this label stick. For the comparative-historical sociologist, the specific contents of any given orthodoxy (creed, metaphysics, dogma, political ideology, scientific paradigm, etc.) are of less interest than the manner in which it maintains its superordinate political position. In what follows I draw a theoretical sketch of orthodoxy in its most extreme and dominant manifestation, that is, a hierocracy, an apparatus with all of the resources of the (secular) state at its disposal.⁴¹ Marxist, Weberian, and Gramscian political sociology offer useful guidelines for this particular “hard” version of orthodoxy.⁴²

In Engels’s discussion of heresy in *The Peasant War in Germany* the church is construed as the institution that represents the interests of the feudal class. Heresies are understood as manifestations of class conflict, as economically grounded challenges to ecclesiastical rule. As Hugues Portelli phrases it, “For Engels, heresy is the ideological expression of a rupture between a subaltern class and a ruling class.”⁴³ The heresy of

⁴⁰ John Locke, *A Letter Concerning Toleration* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983), p. 23.

⁴¹ See Weber, *Economy and Society* (n. 20 above), pp. 1158–1211 and p. 54; and see Roland Robertson, “Church-State Relations in Comparative Perspective,” in *Church-State Relations: Tensions and Transitions*, ed. Thomas Robbins and Roland Robertson (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1987), pp. 153–61.

⁴² Eisenstadt offers a somewhat similar definition of an orthodoxy as an “organized church attempting to mobilize the religious (and, at times, political) sphere, and which emphasizes the structuring of clear cognitive and symbolic boundaries of doctrine” (n. 6 above), p. 6.

⁴³ “Pour Engels l’hérésie est l’expression idéologique de la rupture d’une classe subalterne avec la classe dirigeante.” Hugues Portelli, *Gramsci et la question religieuse* (Paris: Editions Anthropos, 1974), p. 93, and see p. 76.

Lutheranism is depicted as the ideology of the dissatisfied bourgeoisie, while the heretical movement led by Thomas Münzer is another form of “revolutionary opposition to feudalism.”⁴⁴ In a materialist analysis the heretic is an insider on the basis of previous adherence to a shared religious framework. He or she “swerves” as a consequence of a distinct class position.⁴⁵

Max Weber also devoted some attention to the question of heresy. Unfortunately, what little he said about this subject he said with a certain degree of imprecision.⁴⁶ The most promising opening into Weber’s thought on this matter is provided by the somewhat elliptical remarks situated at the end of his chapter “Heterodoxy and Orthodoxy” in *The Religion of China*. There, he speaks of the “heterodox, hence unpolitical” sects in China and then of “heterodox sects, often pursuing political ends and hence politically persecuted.”⁴⁷ Elsewhere he declares, “The political power can offer exceedingly valuable support to the hierocracy by providing the *brachium saeculare* for the annihilation of heretics.”⁴⁸ If anything, this leads us to speculate that for Weber the heresy/orthodoxy nexus represents an asymmetrical relation of political power. Heterodoxy, as best we can tell, refers to politically subordinate religious groups.

Gramsci’s discussions of hegemony evince similarities to ideas found in both Engels and Weber.⁴⁹ Moreover, his work provides a more detailed description of the role that intellectuals play within the apparatus of

⁴⁴ Friedrich Engels, *The Peasant War in Germany*, trans. D. Riazanov (New York: International Publishers, 1926), pp. 52, 56.

⁴⁵ Engels also stressed the role that the clergy plays in promulgating ecclesiastical ideology, an idea that would greatly influence Gramsci. As Bryan Turner points out, “since the Church monopolised mental production through its educational institutions, forms of social and political domination were necessarily expressed through the medium of religious language and ritual,” in his *Religion and Social Theory* (London: Sage, 1997), p. 73; and see Portelli, p. 74.

⁴⁶ In the seventh chapter of *The Religion of China* Weber offers a somewhat different definition of heterodoxy. Weber repeatedly categorizes Confucianism as an orthodoxy, while referring to Taoism, and eventually Buddhism, as heterodoxies (Max Weber, *The Religion of China: Confucianism and Taoism*, trans. and ed. Hans Gerth and C. K. Yang [New York: Free Press, 1964], pp. 177, 188, 190, 199, 212). In so doing, he runs roughshod over the notion of heretics as “deviant insiders.” In *The Religion of China* discrete although somewhat imbricated religious systems (Confucianism on the one side, Taoism and Buddhism on the other) are considered to be in the type of relationship that most scholars reserve for intrareligious developments. Henderson notes, however, that there always has been some ambiguity in the use of the term “heretic” and that it has sometimes stood in for the type of definition used here by Weber (n. 1 above), p. 23.

⁴⁷ Weber, *The Religion*, pp. 224, 225.

⁴⁸ Weber, *Economy and Society*, p. 1175.

⁴⁹ See Portelli, pp. 68–121; John Fulton, “Religion and Politics in Gramsci: An Introduction,” *Sociological Analysis* 48 (1987): 197–216. See Gershon Shafir, “Interpretive Sociology and the Philosophy of Praxis: Comparing Max Weber and Antonio Gramsci,” *Praxis International* 5 (1985): 63–74; and Carl Levy, “Max Weber and Antonio Gramsci,” in *Max Weber and His Contemporaries*, ed. W. Mommsen and J. Osterhammel (London: Unwin Hyman, 1987), pp. 382–402.

orthodoxy.⁵⁰ First, we should note that a hegemonic apparatus has two tasks to fulfill: “the supremacy of a social group manifests itself in two ways, as ‘domination’ and as ‘intellectual and moral leadership’. A social group dominates antagonistic groups, which it tends to ‘liquidate’, or to subjugate perhaps even by armed force; it leads kindred and allied groups.”⁵¹ In order for a group to lead a society it must be willing and able to form a “historical bloc” as opposed to remaining a “closed caste.”⁵² Through intellectual and moral leadership it brings into its fold other groups. Antagonistic groups, conversely, are to be liquidated.

Both Gramsci and Weber recognize that a ruling political apparatus (what I am referring to as a hard orthodoxy) achieves its supremacy through two distinct modes of action: force and consent.⁵³ In Weber’s famous definition the state is seen “as a relation of men dominating men” and monopolizing “*the legitimate use of physical force*.”⁵⁴ For Gramsci, as Perry Anderson demonstrates, “the historical necessity of violence in the destruction and construction of States” was a given.⁵⁵ Ostensibly, both theorists understood the role of coercive measures in the maintenance of any dominant political entity. Yet each also recognized the inherent in-

⁵⁰ As has been often noted, Gramsci was not the originator of the term “hegemony.” For a discussion of its intellectual lineage and impact on Gramsci’s thought see Perry Anderson, “The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci,” *New Left Review* 100 (1976): 5–78, esp. 15–18; Paul Piccone, *Italian Marxism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), pp. 10–11; John Hoffman, *The Gramscian Challenge: Coercion and Consent in Marxist Political Theory* (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1984), pp. 51–75. As Bates has pointed out, Gramsci’s remarks on hegemony are “fragmented and dispersed throughout his *Quaderni del carcere*” (Thomas Bates, “Gramsci and the Theory of Hegemony,” *Journal of the History of Ideas* 36 [1975]: 351; also see Joseph Femia, “Hegemony and Consciousness in the Thought of Antonio Gramsci,” *Political Studies* 23 [1975]: 29; David McLellan, *Marxism after Marx: An Introduction* [Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1979], p. 180). This concept, however, has only been rarely applied to the study of religion. For some notable exceptions see Arnaldo Nesti, “Gramsci et la religion populaire,” *Social Compass* 22 (1975): 343–54; Fulton; Mario Caceres, “Gramsci, la religion et les systèmes socio-économiques,” *Social Compass* 35 (1988): 279–96; Portelli; Claudio Vasale, *Politica e religione in A. Gramsci: Lateodicea della secolarizzazione* (Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1979), pp. 47–84.

⁵¹ Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci*, ed. and trans. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell-Smith (New York: International, 1975), p. 570; also see Benedetto Fontana, *Hegemony and Power: On the Relation between Gramsci and Machiavelli* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), p. 144.

⁵² For example, Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, pp. 418, 377; also see Fulton, p. 209; on a “closed caste,” see Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, p. 260; Roger Simon, “Gramsci’s Concept of Hegemony,” *Marxism Today* (March 1977), p. 80. Walter Adamson writes, “an historical bloc is in one sense an effort to infuse this hegemony throughout society, above all by means of class alliances” in his *Hegemony and Revolution: A Study of Antonio Gramsci’s Political and Cultural Theory* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), p. 176; also see Anne Showstack Sassoon, *Gramsci’s Politics* (New York: St. Martin’s, 1980), pp. 119–25.

⁵³ Levy, pp. 394–96.

⁵⁴ Max Weber, *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, trans., ed., and with an introduction by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 78.

⁵⁵ Anderson, p. 46.

feasibility of rule solely by coercion. Gramsci's hegemonic apparatus attempts to avoid the moment of force insofar as "violence *qua* violence is highly unstable, unpredictable, and costly."⁵⁶ An identical realization led Weber to observe that physical force is often "the last resort" and that every system of legitimate domination "attempts to establish and to cultivate the belief in its legitimacy."⁵⁷ Weber spoke of "inner justifications,"⁵⁸ and Gramsci spoke of "consent"—the endeavor of a hegemonic apparatus to persuade other groups and classes to acquiesce to its view of "the natural."⁵⁹

Intellectuals, for Gramsci, play a crucial role in stimulating consent. They are scattered throughout "civil society," where they tirelessly endeavor to inculcate the ideological imperatives of the hegemonic apparatus.⁶⁰ As regards forms of religious hegemony, Gramsci writes, "religions, in the first place Catholicism, are 'elaborated and set up' by the intellectuals . . . and the ecclesiastical hierarchy."⁶¹ In another discussion

⁵⁶ Fontana, p. 144; also see Carl Boggs, *The Two Revolutions: Antonio Gramsci and the Dilemmas of Western Marxism* (Boston: South End, 1984), p. 159; Otto Maduro, *Religion and Social Conflicts*, trans. Robert Barr (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1982), p. 72.

⁵⁷ Weber, *Economy and Society* (n. 20 above), pp. 54, 213.

⁵⁸ Weber, *From Max Weber*, pp. 78–79.

⁵⁹ As Perry Anderson notes, Gramsci "carefully distinguishes the necessity for coercion of *enemy* classes, and consensual direction of *allied* classes" (p. 45). In "The Modern Prince," Gramsci observes, "The 'normal' exercise of hegemony on the now classical terrain of the parliamentary régime is characterised by the combination of force and consent, which balance each other reciprocally, without force predominating excessively over consent" (*Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, p. 80, n. 49). Elsewhere, in an apparent reference to hegemony, Gramsci indicates that force must be "ingeniously combined" with consent and persuasion (p. 310). One thinks of Sassoon's remark that for Gramsci "The political is not defined by, it cannot be understood in terms of, only one of its attributes, of force or consent. It is both force and consent" (p. 112). As for consent, James Scott observes that for Gramsci the poor are "coconspirators in their own victimization" (*Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance* [New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1985], p. 318). Or, to use Joseph Femia's clever phrase, "the proletariat . . . wear their chains willingly" (p. 31).

⁶⁰ Civil society consists of "the ensemble of organisms commonly called 'private'" (Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, p. 12). These include schools, churches, newspapers, magazines, books, family, clubs, "even architecture and the layout and names of streets" (Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from Cultural Writings*, ed. David Forgacs and Geoffrey Nowell-Smith, trans. William Boelhower [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991], p. 389), all of which are used by the hegemonic group in an effort to achieve cultural ascendancy (Gramsci, *Selections from Prison Notebooks*, p. 342; also see Renate Holub, *Antonio Gramsci: Beyond Marxism and Postmodernism* [London: Routledge, 1992], p. 6; Edward Said, *Orientalism* [New York: Vintage Books, 1979], p. 7; James Scott, "Hegemony and the Peasantry," *Politics and Society* 7 (1977): 273; Joseph Femia, *Gramsci's Political Thought: Hegemony, Consciousness, and the Revolutionary Process* [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981], p. 26). In political society, on the other hand, we may identify nonprivate organisms, or apparatuses, of the state. These include legislature, judiciary, and executive (Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, p. 246) institutions of violence such as police, military, intelligence agencies, etc. Gramsci's intellectuals should be contrasted to Weber's intellectuals, "champions of individuality" who "do not necessarily advocate ideas that are conducive to their material interests" (Ahmad Sadri, *Max Weber's Sociology of Intellectuals* [New York: Oxford University Press, 1992], pp. 74, 71).

⁶¹ Gramsci, *Selections from Cultural Writings*, p. 190.

he states "Religion, or a particular church, maintains its community of faithful . . . in so far as it nourishes its faith permanently and in an organised fashion, indefatigably repeating its apologetics, struggling at all times and always with the same kind of arguments, and maintaining a hierarchy of intellectuals who give to the faith, in appearance at least, the dignity of thought."⁶²

Via a consolidation of the arguments examined above, I propose one provisional definition. A (religious) orthodoxy (of the purest and hardest type) is a superordinate compulsory organization composed of a leading class in cahoots with other classes and social groups that (1) controls the means of material, intellectual, and symbolic production; (2) articulates "correct" forms of belief and praxis through the work of rationalizing and consent-generating intellectuals (and/or priests); (3) identifies "incorrect" forms of belief and praxis through these same intellectuals; (4) institutionally manages deviant individuals and groups through coercive mechanisms (e.g., physical and symbolic violence, excessive taxation, ostracism, etc.) or through "re-education," compromise, accommodation, and so on.⁶³

How might we insert heretics into this scheme? In correspondence with the view mentioned above of heretics as "within the circle," we might posit them as intellectuals who dissent from the very orthodoxy to which they once belonged. The heretic is thus an insider by dint of once having performed intellectual activity on behalf of the orthodoxy. We might refer to these as "intellectual heresies" or as dissent stemming from members of an intellectual elite (e.g., theologians, party higher-ups, established scientists).

Gramsci, for his part, raises the possibility of what we might call "mass heresies." These constitute a failure of hegemony or what he referred to as "una rottura tra massa e intellettuali nella chiesa" [a rupture between the masses and intellectuals in the Church].⁶⁴ Elsewhere he avers, "Many heretical movements were manifestations of popular forces aiming to reform the Church and bring it closer to the people by exalting them."⁶⁵ In this example, the intellectuals of the church have failed to generate consent. Here, heretics (i.e., the masses) are insiders only in the sense that they

⁶² Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks* (n. 51 above), p. 340.

⁶³ I would restate that for Gramsci and Weber a religion's relation to political power assumed different forms throughout history. Not all orthodoxies have the entire state apparatus at their disposal, a state of affairs recognized in Weber's discussion of the pure type of Caesaropapism and Gramsci's reflections on the Italy of his times. Gramsci occasionally discussed instances in which a religious group was not the directive grouping but one group within a hegemonic apparatus (see *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, pp. 245, 90, 100), and also see *Selections from Cultural Writings*, p. 299; Fulton (n. 49 above), pp. 211–12; Nesti (n. 50 above), pp. 348–49; and Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato, *Civil Society and Political Theory* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992), p. 144.

⁶⁴ Gramsci, *Quaderni del carcere: Volume primo, volume secondo* (Turin: Giulio Einaudi, 1977), p. 1384; also see Portelli (n. 43 above), p. 94.

⁶⁵ Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, p. 397.

adhere to the same religious faith as the orthodoxy (i.e., Catholicism). The border between mass and intellectual heresies is, as Weber would say, “fluid,” and we should not discount the possibility of mass heresies led by intellectuals. In fact, Bourdieu seems to allude to a somewhat similar possibility when he suggests that heresy arises when “in a crisis situation, contestation of the ecclesiastical monopoly by a fraction of the clergy encounters the anticlerical interests of a fraction of the laity and leads to contestation of ecclesiastical monopoly as such.”⁶⁶

DURKHEIMIAN AND SIMMELIAN APPROACHES

Heresy researchers—who only rarely cite sociological studies—implicitly work with the types of assumptions articulated by Gramsci and Weber. The writings of Émile Durkheim, by contrast, have had little direct or indirect impact on workers in this area. In light of the well-known drawbacks of his sociology, this neglect may initially seem justifiable; in many ways his ideas are singularly unserviceable for heresy research. As Coser noted, “There is no reference in any of Durkheim’s writings to the divisive and dysfunctional aspects of religious practices.”⁶⁷ While Durkheim would often allude to the various functions of religion,⁶⁸ he rarely engaged the question of the functions of religiously differentiated groups.⁶⁹ How can a theorist who believed that “religion was necessarily productive of unity, solidarity, and cohesion” contribute anything to a discussion about the divisive heretic?⁷⁰

It is Durkheim’s far less subjectivist conception of agency, I believe, that provides fruitful alternative leads for the study of heresy and orthodoxy. In Weber and Gramsci conscious intentions assume a place of analytical prominence. The heresy/orthodoxy nexus is construed as the dividend of meaning-driven social action carried out by antagonistic groups who consciously pursue their objective interests. For these writers orthodoxies endeavor to impose their will upon heretics who, in turn, struggle to resist. An examination of the stated goals and motivations of

⁶⁶ Elsewhere, Bourdieu speaks of the heretical potential of the “lower clergy” (“Genesis” [n. 21 above], pp. 26, 27–28). See n. 104 below for more observations on Bourdieu’s conception of heresy.

⁶⁷ Lewis Coser, “Durkheim’s Conservatism and Its Implications for His Sociological Theory,” in *Essays in Sociology and Philosophy*, ed. K. H. Wolff (New York: Harper, 1960), pp. 225, 215.

⁶⁸ Steven Lukes, *Emile Durkheim, His Life and Work: A Historical and Critical Study* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1985), p. 475; Jonathan Turner and Alexandra Maryanski, *Functionalism* (Menlo Park, Calif.: Benjamin/Cummings, 1979), p. 22; Talcott Parsons, *Essays in Sociological Theory*, rev. ed. (New York: Free Press, 1954), p. 206.

⁶⁹ Robert Merton, *On Theoretical Sociology: Five Essays Old and New* (New York: Free Press, 1967), p. 83; S. N. Eisenstadt, “Functional Analysis in Anthropology and Sociology: An Interpretive Essay,” *Annual Review of Anthropology* 19 (1990): 251.

⁷⁰ Coser, “Durkheim’s Conservatism,” p. 225.

heretics and inquisitors (as preserved in whatever historical documents are available) becomes the natural starting point for research of this nature.

Durkheimian sociology, as is well known, is predicated upon entirely different theoretical foundations. As Stjepan Meštrović observes, “What [Durkheim] sought was a methodology that would go beyond the ‘actor’s point of view’ to reach that which even the actor does not know that he or she knows.”⁷¹ Ostensibly, such an approach de-emphasizes the importance of the agent’s conscious intentions. Or, as Albert Pierce described it, the “conscious expectations or aspirations of individual members of the society . . . have no causal efficacy.”⁷² It was Durkheim, after all, who was willing to argue that the reasons that one gives for having attempted to commit suicide may not be the actual reasons that impelled one to try to take his or her life.⁷³ It follows, then, that the inquisitor might be equally deluded as to why the heretic was really pursued and punished. Similarly, the heretic’s dissent might be stimulated by forces of which the heretic is completely unaware.

Durkheimian sociology permits us to posit a “cause” or source of thought and behavior radically different from the type of conscious, meaningful social action in the name of group self-interest that we see in Weber and Gramsci. Jennifer Lehmann, in her *Deconstructing Durkheim: A Post-Post-Structuralist Critique*, observes, “He views the collective body and mind in particular . . . as constituting a real, objective *entity*. Society is to him a vast, complex, superior, living *being*.”⁷⁴ It follows then that this entity called society “acts to shape the mentalities and influence the conduct of its human agents, who are a necessary but insufficient condition of its existence.”⁷⁵ We can now transpose Durkheim’s famous discussions of criminality in *The Rules of Sociological Method* into the key of heresy research.⁷⁶ Religious dissent, like other forms of deviant behavior, may be seen as one of “the fundamental conditions of all social life,” one that satisfies certain social needs.⁷⁷ In this scheme, a sort of social imperative

⁷¹ Stjepan Meštrović, “Durkheim’s Concept of the Unconscious,” *Current Perspectives in Social Theory* 5 (1984): 277, and *Émile Durkheim and the Reformation of Sociology* (Totowa, N.J.: Rowan & Littlefield, 1988), p. 13; Ken Morrison, “Durkheim and Schopenhauer: New Textual Evidence on the Conceptual History of Durkheim’s Formulation of the Egoistic-Altruistic Types of Suicide,” *Durkheimian Studies* 4 (1998): 121; Philip Mellor, “Sacred Contagion and Social Vitality: Collective Effervescence in *Les Formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse*,” *Durkheimian Studies* 4 (1998): 105.

⁷² Albert Pierce, “Durkheim and Functionalism,” in *Essays on Sociology and Philosophy*, ed. K. H. Wolff (New York: Harper, 1960), p. 156.

⁷³ Émile Durkheim, *Suicide: A Study in Sociology*, trans. J. Spaulding and G. Simpson (New York: Free Press, 1966), p. 43.

⁷⁴ Jennifer Lehmann, *Deconstructing Durkheim: A Post-Post-Structuralist Critique* (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 29; Émile Durkheim, *Montesquieu and Rousseau: Forerunners of Sociology* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1960), p. 2.

⁷⁵ Pierce, p. 160.

⁷⁶ Durkheim, *The Rules* (n. 16 above), pp. 64–75.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 70.

works through agents, impelling them to engage in either heretical activity or its persecution. The agent—trapped within the prison house of his or her own individual consciousness—is not able to recognize how the antagonism and destruction that marks the heresy/orthodoxy nexus may have positive ramifications for the social totality to which they belong.

A strikingly similar approach can be identified in Simmel's writings on this topic. The pairing of heterodoxy and orthodoxy is seen as a form of interaction that generates the unity that Simmel believes is the very goal of sociation.⁷⁸ The following statement from his "Contribution to Sociology of Religion" is instructive in this regard:

That which arrays great masses of people in hatred and moral condemnation of heretics is certainly not the difference in the dogmatic content of teaching; in most instances, this content really is not understood at all. Rather, it is the fact of the *opposition* of the one against the many. The persecution of heretics and dissenters springs from the instinct for the necessity of group unity. It is especially significant that many instances of this kind of religious *deviance* coexist with the unity of the group in all vital matters. But in religion the social instinct for unity has assumed such a pure, abstract, and at the same time substantial form that it no longer requires a union with real interests. Nonconformity therefore seems to threaten the unity—that is to say, the very life form—of the group as it is and as people visualize it. Just as an attack on a palladium or other symbol of group unity will evoke the most violent reaction, even though it may have no direct connection with group unity, so religion is the purest form of unity in society. . . . This truth is demonstrated by the energy with which every heresy, no matter how irrelevant, is combated.⁷⁹

Simmel's heretics, like Durkheim's criminals, supply the social body with crucial life-sustaining functions. In his essay "Conflict," Simmel observes, "the consciousness of unity of the Catholic Church has been decisively strengthened by the fact of heresy and the aggressive behavior against it. The irreconcilability of their opposition to heresy has permitted the various elements within the Church, as it were, to orient themselves and to remember their unity, despite certain divergent interests."⁸⁰

Heretics can thus be viewed as unwitting catalysts for social unity, not to mention intellectual development and social change. In *The Rules* Durkheim proclaimed, "Socrates was a criminal, and his condemnation was no more than just. However, his crime, namely, the independence of his thought, rendered a service not only to humanity but to his country."⁸¹

⁷⁸ Georg Simmel, *Georg Simmel on Individuality and Social Forms*, ed. Donald Levine (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), pp. 23, 24.

⁷⁹ Georg Simmel, *Essays on Religion*, ed. and trans. H. J. Helle and L. Nieder (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1997), pp. 114–15.

⁸⁰ Georg Simmel, *Conflict and the Web of Group-Affiliations*, trans. K. Wolff and R. Bendix (New York: Free Press, 1964), pp. 98, 93.

⁸¹ Durkheim, *The Rules*, p. 71, *Moral Education: A Study in the Theory and Application of the Sociology of Education*, trans. Everett K. Wilsom and Herman Schnurer (New York: Free Press, 1975), p. 53.

In fact, the belief that the heretic is a progressive element, one who heroically (albeit, perhaps, unknowingly) expands the parameters of a restricted conscience collective for future generations to benefit, constitutes a veritable axiom in recent heresy research. This ranges from Georges Duby's description of heresy in feudal times as "perhaps the most convincing sign, of that tumultuous vitality that impelled Western civilization forward in its sudden advance" to the self-explanatory title of Bourdieu's article, "Vive la crise! For Heterodoxy in Social Science."⁸² It should be recalled, however, that heretics may be beholden to the most reactionary, incoherent, senselessly violent or insignificant of positions. It would be better to see them as potential catalysts for social change, as opposed to social progress; a value-neutral orientation is in order.

Both Durkheim and Simmel make assumptions about the consciousness of agents, which differ from those seen in the thought of Weber and Gramsci. Notice the theme of obfuscation in Simmel's passage cited above: the group thinks it punishes the heretic for the violation of the symbol, when in reality the crime is against group unity. Durkheim, as is well known, posits similar acts of misrecognition in *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*. As Bryan Turner writes, "The beliefs of the participants were in fact mistaken, since the real object of worship was the social group."⁸³ This line of reasoning is not limited, of course, to these two theorists. Engels makes a similar surmise about the human being's boundless capacity to misrecognize social reality when he asserts "the class struggles of that time appear to bear religious earmarks . . . the interests, requirements and demands of the various classes hid themselves behind a religious screen."⁸⁴

That there exist powerful social forces outside of the awareness of agents—but accessible to the insightful theoretical sociologist—is not necessarily an easy idea to digest. That a heretic is martyred for the good of the social body is not a surmise made by heretics or their sympathizers. Nor can it be said that the inquisitor understands the burning of this dissenter as an activity that loosens the vice grips of a constricted conscience collective for future generations to benefit. In part, this may ac-

⁸² Georges Duby, *The Three Orders: Feudal Society Imagined*, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), p. 31; Pierre Bourdieu, "Vive la crise! For Heterodoxy in Social Science," *Theory and Society* 7 (1988): 773–87; Weber in *The Religion of China* (n. 46 above) also seems to count on heterodoxy for the stimulation of innovation or a break from the traditional structures of Confucianism. Yang, in the introduction to this work, writes, "Weber's problem was to find out whether such heterodoxy as Taoism could have been 'the source of a methodical way of life different from the official orientation' and could have initiated a trend toward capitalism" (p. xxxiv; also see Eisenstadt, "Dissent" [n. 6 above], p. 1). For other positive evaluations of the heretic see Erikson (n. 16 above); and Wolpe, "Holistic Heresy"; Stambolovic; and Gürsoy (all in n. 9 above).

⁸³ Turner (n. 45 above), p. 243.

⁸⁴ Engels (n. 44 above), p. 86.

count for the paucity of so-called functionalist and objectivist approaches to the study of heresy and the preponderance of loose variants of the agency-oriented social theory of Weber and Gramsci. When plowing through the archives of a fourteenth-century inquisition, it is difficult enough (in light of sparse documentation, problems of translation, etc.) to identify what the inquisitor and the incarcerated heretic thought they were doing. Yet even Max Weber, the founder of *Verstehen* sociology, warns us that the “conscious motives” of the actor may not be one and the same as “the real driving force of his action.”⁸⁵

So while the existence of an authoritative political apparatus capable of identifying heretics and effectively “managing” them is the fundamental precondition for the study of heresy, the types of approaches discussed in this section force us to qualify this statement. In managing its heretics this political apparatus may be impelled by social forces and cultural logic that it neither understands nor perceives. The same can be said about the heretic who so passionately assails the orthodoxy.

Doxa

A glance at our epigraph reveals Pierre Bourdieu’s introduction of a third concept, *doxa*, to accompany the old duo of heresy and orthodoxy. From the outset, it must be stressed that this initiative has been forged in the crucible of rather secular problematics. While it is true that in an earlier study the prophet is equated with the heretic, Bourdieu’s heretics are as likely to be professors in the modern French university.⁸⁶ Be that as it may, the *doxic* conception, I believe, poses new and interesting questions to scholars of religion.

For Bourdieu, orthodoxy and heterodoxy exist in “the universe of discourse (or argument)” while *doxa* resides in “the universe of the undiscussed.”⁸⁷ Yet in spite of their paradiscursive nature, *doxic* beliefs are “known” by agents. Or, as Loïc Wacquant describes it, they comprise “a

⁸⁵ Weber, *Economy and Society* (n. 20 above), p. 9.

⁸⁶ Bourdieu’s equation of the heretic with the prophet occurs in his 1991 piece “Genesis and Structure of the Religious Field” (n. 21 above), originally published in French in 1971. Secular heretics appear in more recent studies. Thus, in *Homo Academicus* (n. 7 above), Bourdieu speaks of the debate between traditionalist schools (represented by Raymond Picard) and modernist schools (represented by Roland Barthes) of literary interpretation in France. Defenders of the orthodoxy were forced by Barthes’s challenge to make “as explicit profession of faith, the *doxa* of the doctors, their silent beliefs which have no need for justification . . . (producing) in broad daylight the unconscious thoughts of an institution” (p. 116). On the discipline of sociology as the “solvent of *doxa*,” see Loïc Wacquant, “The Double-Edged Sword of Reason: The Scholar’s Predicament and the Sociologist’s Mission,” *European Journal of Social Theory* 2 (1999): 275–81. David Swartz, in “Bridging the Study of Culture and Religion: Pierre Bourdieu’s Political Economy of Symbolic Power,” *Sociology of Religion* 57 (1996): 71, calls attention to Bourdieu’s relative lack of interest in religion.

⁸⁷ Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 168.

realm of implicit and unstated beliefs . . . which govern their practices and representations” without agents even realizing it.⁸⁸ In his many asides on the topic, Bourdieu offers the following descriptions of *doxa*: “the pre-verbal taking-for-granted of the world that flows from practical sense”;⁸⁹ “fundamental acceptance of the established order situated outside the reach of critique”;⁹⁰ “the world of tradition experienced as a ‘natural world’ and taken for granted”;⁹¹ presuppositions-*doxa*-of “the game”;⁹² “unthought assumptions”;⁹³ “the ensemble of fundamental beliefs which do not even need to affirm themselves in the guise of an explicit dogma, conscious of itself”;⁹⁴ “an adherence to relations of order which, because they structure inseparably both the real world and the thought world, are accepted as self-evident.”⁹⁵

To this point we see that *doxa* is what agents immediately know but do not know that they know. Or, as Bourdieu cleverly expresses this idea, it “goes without saying because it comes without saying.”⁹⁶ In their unrecognized state, *doxic* beliefs are shared by all members of a field. Inquisitors and heretics may disagree over many issues, but they all concur, albeit unknowingly, as to certain *doxic* “truths.” Here there is unanimity or what Bourdieu refers to as “an unquestioned and unified cultural ‘tradition.’”⁹⁷

Yet *doxic* assumptions shadow, so to speak, the imperatives of orthodox rule. Bourdieu addresses this problematic with clarity in *Practical Rea-*

⁸⁸ L  ic Wacquant, “Towards an Archaeology of Academe: A Critical Appreciation of Fritz Ringer’s ‘Fields of Knowledge,’” *Acta Sociologica* 38 (1995): 185; also see Pierre Bourdieu, *Practical Reason: On the Theory of Action* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 81.

⁸⁹ Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice*, trans. Richard Nice (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1990), p. 68.

⁹⁰ Pierre Bourdieu and L. J. D. Wacquant (n. 15 above), p. 247; also see pp. 73–74.

⁹¹ Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory*, pp. 164, 166.

⁹² Bourdieu, *The Logic*, p. 66.

⁹³ Bourdieu, “The Specificity” (n. 8 above), p. 279, also see “Genesis,” p. 13.

⁹⁴ “l’ensemble de croyances fondamentales qui n’ont m  me pas besoin de s’affirmer sous la forme d’un dogme explicite et conscient de lui-m  me” (Bourdieu, *M  ditations pascaliennes* [Paris: Seuil, 1997], p. 26).

⁹⁵ Bourdieu, *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste*, trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984), p. 471, and also see “The Philosophical Institution,” in *Philosophy in France Today*, ed. Alan Montefiore (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 1–8; Pierre Bourdieu and J. C. Passeron, “Sociology and Philosophy in France since 1945: Death and Resurrection of a Philosophy without Subject,” *Social Research* 34 (1967): 162–212; Craig Calhoun, *Critical Social Theory: Culture, History, and the Challenge of Difference* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), pp. 56, 151.

⁹⁶ Bourdieu, *Outline*, p. 167.

⁹⁷ Bourdieu and Wacquant, *Invitation*, p. 248, n. 45; and see Bourdieu, *Practical Reason*, p. 67, *Ce que parler veut dire: L’  conomie des   changes linguistiques* (Paris: Fayard, 1982), p. 156, *M  ditations*, pp. 22, 123; Beate Kraus, “Gender and Symbolic Violence: Female Oppression in the Light of Pierre Bourdieu’s Theory of Social Practice,” in *Bourdieu: Critical Perspectives*, ed. Craig Calhoun, Edward LiPuma, and Moishe Postone (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), p. 169.

son: “Doxa is a particular point of view, the point of view of the dominant, which presents and imposes itself as a universal point of view—the point of view of those who dominate by dominating the state and who have constituted their point of view as universal by constituting the state.”⁹⁸ As such, we may speculate that *doxic* beliefs are the unseen and unforeseen epistemological residue of an intentional system of domination. They arise as an unintended consequence of an otherwise intentional attempt at domination.

Notice how this scheme synthesizes the conflicting sociological traditions discussed above. It acknowledges that social groups intentionally endeavor to dominate others—a theme that is all but absent in Durkheim’s writing on religion.⁹⁹ Bourdieu’s understanding of the consensual dimensions of this enterprise certainly bears similarities to the Gramscian and Weberian perspectives mentioned earlier. To achieve religious power is to achieve “the *monopoly of the legitimate exercise of the power to modify, in a deep and lasting fashion, the practice and world-view of lay people*, by imposing on and inculcating in them a particular *religious habitus*. By this I mean a lasting, generalized and transposable disposition to act and think in conformity with the principles of a (quasi-) systematic view of the world and human existence.”¹⁰⁰ Yet at the same time Bourdieu accounts for factors outside the control or comprehension of agents—a relatively neglected possibility in Gramscian and Weberian sociology.

Bourdieu appears to indicate that heretics are those who can discover *doxa* and thus precipitate “epistemological rupture.”¹⁰¹ “The dominated classes,” he reasons, “have an interest in pushing back the limits of *doxa* and exposing the arbitrariness of the taken for granted; the dominant classes have an interest in defending the integrity of *doxa* or, short of this, of establishing in its place the necessarily imperfect substitute, *orthodoxy*.”¹⁰² The *doxic* discoverer, Bourdieu insinuates, uncovers or un.masks some obscured mechanism of domination. He thus seems to draw an association

⁹⁸ Bourdieu, *Practical Reason* (n. 88 above), p. 57. Swartz notes that for Bourdieu “taken-for-granted assumptions” play an active role in “the constitution and maintenance of power relations” (n. 86 above), p. 76.

⁹⁹ Coser, “Durkheim’s Conservatism” (n. 67 above).

¹⁰⁰ “Legitimation” (n. 30 above), pp. 119–36.

¹⁰¹ Bourdieu and Wacquant (n. 15 above), p. 251, n. 49; Bourdieu, *Ce que parler*, pp. 150–51, and *Outline* (n. 87 above), pp. 168–70; Craig Calhoun, “Habitus, Field, and Capital: The Question of Historical Specificity,” in Calhoun, LiPuma, and Postone, eds., p. 80; Kraus, p. 167; Bourdieu, “Concluding Remarks: For a Sociogenetic Understanding of Intellectual Works,” in Calhoun, LiPuma, and Postone, eds., p. 269, and *Les règles de l’art: Genèse et structure du champ littéraire* (Paris: Seuil, 1992), p. 261; and see B. Berger, *An Essay on Culture: Symbolic Structure and Social Structure* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), p. 34.

¹⁰² Bourdieu, *Outline*, p. 169.

between dominated strata and heretical activity.¹⁰³ In Bourdieu's discussions of *doxa*, then, the heretic is the subordinate field dweller who suddenly recognizes some unrecognized belief about the world that buttresses the dominant position of an orthodoxy.¹⁰⁴

Scholars of religion may use the notion of *doxa* to pose a variety of unconventional questions. What do heretics and their persecutors share in common? What is the "unquestioned and unified cultural tradition" that binds together these adversaries? The identification of such tacit commonalities may be useful in foregrounding and contextualizing the explicit disagreements of the participants; by understanding what is not being argued about we may better understand what is. Then there is the case of multireligious societies. Here, an orthodoxy confronts its own heretics and members of distinct religious traditions (e.g., Jews in various forms of Western Christendom). Under such circumstances we could ask if *doxic* commonalities exist only among (antagonistic) coreligionists. Or, are they shared by all contemporary members of that society, regardless of the religion to which they belong? It may also be of interest to see if Bourdieu is correct in his surmise that heretics are those who extract *doxa*. Is the bringing to light of previously shared unspoken assumptions something that heretics seem to do across time and space? Does this always occur in crisis situations? Empirical research will also need to examine the proposition that the heretical impulse inclines to appear among dominated or subaltern strata.

We have only pointed to the possibilities, not the problems, raised by the idea of *doxa*. In brief, some might be perplexed by the claim that a

¹⁰³ On the importance of crisis in stimulating the questioning of *doxa*, see *ibid.*, p. 169. Calhoun ("Habitus," p. 80) sees *doxic* crisis as stimulated when "people are brought into routine contact with others quite different from themselves." Also see Cheleen Mahar, Richard Harker, and Chris Wilkes, "The Basic Theoretical Position," in *An Introduction to the Work of Pierre Bourdieu: The Practice of Theory*, ed. Richard Harker, Cheleen Mahar, and Chris Wilkes (New York: St. Martin's, 1990), p. 16.

¹⁰⁴ Elsewhere, however, a somewhat different conception of heresy is advanced. This occurs in Bourdieu's 1991 "Genesis and Structure of the Religious Field" (n. 21 above) and its 1987 variant, "Legitimation and Structured Interests in Weber's Sociology of Religion." Without justifying the association, Bourdieu consistently equates the prophet with the heretic (in the Hebrew Bible, however, we hear of prophets who seem to defend the orthodoxy/monarchy against antagonistic prophets such as Jeremiah, e.g., Jer. 28, 26:10). His prophet/heretic is everywhere at odds with the church (i.e., "trustee and guardian of an orthodoxy") and its priestly hierarchy (Bourdieu, "Genesis," pp. 24, 26–27, also see pp. 35, 23). He or she is seen as the figure who—without actually recognizing it—manages to articulate and mobilize "the virtually heretical religious interests of determinate groups or classes of laypersons" (who themselves misrecognize that they are the source of the message they attribute to the prophet) during a situation of crisis (p. 24, also see pp. 25, 26, and "Legitimation," pp. 126–29, 130, 131). In the final paragraph of the 1991 piece (pp. 37–38, also see p. 35), Bourdieu seems to draw an association between the prophet (i.e., the heretic) and the ability to "supply the means of thinking this unthinkable" (*doxa*?), but the passage itself is not easy to understand. At this point I am not certain as to how this earlier depiction of the prophet/heretic can be fused with his later discussions of *doxa*.

dominant group at once “imposes” *doxa* and at the same time is oblivious to its existence. This would seem to demonstrate how thoroughly the deck is stacked in favor of superordinate groups in Bourdieu’s sociology.¹⁰⁵ A problem also occurs when we realize that heretics, and heretics only, can fulfill the dual role of dupes and decipherers of *doxa*. We must ask how the heretic can occupy two epistemological spaces at once. It would seem as likely that members of an orthodoxy would recognize the implicit beliefs that so efficiently undergird their own dominance.¹⁰⁶

CONCLUSION: THEORIZING THE NEXUS

In closing, I will articulate three distinct, though imbricated, definitions of the phenomena discussed in this article. These are stated in hopes that they will be refined, recast, and even usefully rejected by other students of the nexus. Each definition represents, admittedly, a rather superficial theoretical compromise between the possibilities raised by the more agency-oriented positions of Weber and Gramsci and Durkheimian sociology, in which conscious intentions assume a place of little analytical prominence. Of course, any serious endeavor to reconcile the subjectivist and objectivist traditions within social theory would require engagement with a variety of ontological and epistemological issues well beyond the scope of this article.¹⁰⁷ For now, I will simply suggest that when studying the heresy/orthodoxy nexus we posit the existence of two analytical

¹⁰⁵ See Nicholas Garnham, “Bourdieu, the Cultural Arbitrary, and Television,” in Calhoun, LiPuma, Postone, eds., p. 179; and see Bourdieu, *La domination masculine* (Paris: Seuil, 1998), p. 133.

¹⁰⁶ We might adopt another of Bourdieu’s concepts as a means of accounting for the aforementioned “insiderness” of the heretic. We could argue that heretics share with orthodoxy “field-specific” *doxic* beliefs incorporated within what Bourdieu refers to as the habitus (see Wacquant, “Towards” [n. 88 above], pp. 184–85; and Bourdieu, *Méditations* [n. 94 above], pp. 22, 121). In *The Logic of Practice* (n. 89 above), Bourdieu explains, “Sociology treats as identical all biological individuals who, being the products of the same objective conditions, have the same *habitus*. A social class (in-itself)—a class of identical or similar conditions of existence and conditionings—is at the same time a class of biological individuals having the same *habitus*” (p. 59). What is useful for our purposes is that habitus is constituted by a large quantity of sociological variables; “embodied history,” Bourdieu calls it (p. 56). Thus, the heretic—one who shares a similar habitus with all other members of the orthodoxy—effectively shares numerous “conditions of existence” with members of this group. Such an approach might be preferable to the monocausal explanations of the heretic’s “insiderness” discussed above. A more precise statement of the relation between *doxa* and habitus is also in order. Should we assume that *doxa* is the “structured” disposition of the habitus (see Bourdieu, *The Logic*, p. 68)? On the incorporation of *doxa* within habitus see Kraus, p. 169; John Codd, “Making Distinctions: The Eye of the Beholder,” in Harker, Mahar, and Wilkes, eds., p. 145.

¹⁰⁷ Suffice it to say that future attempts to theorize heresy need to integrate objectivist and subjectivist modes of analysis. It is precisely this effort to collapse “the antinomy of social physics and social phenomenology” that is central to Bourdieu’s project (Bourdieu and Wacquant, p. 7); also see Bourdieu, *The Logic*, pp. 30–51, and “Vive” (n. 82 above), p. 780. Also of interest is Meštrović’s claim that Durkheim’s central concept of the “collective representation” is an attempt to mediate between objectivism and subjectivism (see n. 71 above).

levels. The first level requires that we take seriously what inquisitors and heretics think they are doing and how the endeavor to dominate and to resist domination contributes to the overall configuration of the nexus. The second level alerts us to the possibility that the nexus itself may have causes and effects that are beyond the control, intentionality, and comprehension of the agents we are observing.

Heterodoxy/orthodoxy: A relation of political superordination and subordination witnessed across time and space. The relation presupposes the existence of a social body sufficiently differentiated to permit the genesis and expression of heterogeneous thought among its members. It also presupposes the existence of an organization that can articulate a particular conception of “the natural,” promulgate this view, and control those of its members who deviate from it. This interaction is most visible in the context of religious history (notably Christianity and Islam, where the terms were first postulated). Yet although it is most conspicuous in the religious sphere, the heresy/orthodoxy nexus is not exclusive to that sphere. It is discernible in academic disciplines, political movements, professions, schools of artistic thought, in short, anywhere where there exists an organization of men and women capable of expounding a “straight” opinion and managing those of its members who “swerve.”

The relation between heterodoxy and orthodoxy may have causes and consequences that those who participate in the relation do not readily recognize. Agents, on either side of the divide, are not likely to understand that the interaction may stimulate social (or at least group) unity, strengthen social bonds, unleash salutary ideas into the world, not to mention a variety of possible dysfunctional dividends. Nor is an orthodoxy able to see that in stigmatizing, imprisoning, or compromising with the heretic, it comes to be itself. Bourdieu’s notion of *doxa* reminds us that students of this nexus must also be receptive to the existence of an unrecognized unanimity between the putative belligerents. Heretics and inquisitors share beliefs about the world in common, albeit unknowingly. These provide a shared epistemological backdrop against which specific disagreements are highlighted.

Orthodoxy: Any organization of human beings who can advance a binding conception of “the natural” and enforce adherence to this conception. The essential attribute of an orthodoxy, what distinguishes it from all contemporaneous others who also advance a conception of the “natural,” is its ability to manage, as it sees fit, those within its ranks who deviate. An orthodoxy is rendered vulnerable—or thinks it is rendered vulnerable—by internal dissent, by those who for all intents and purposes it conceives of as “one of us.” The student of heresy must identify the particular sociological basis upon which this perception rests. Subjectively, the criteria that make one a member of “our” group in the eyes of the orthodoxy

must be ascertained. It must be recalled, however, that the social vision of the orthodoxy may be faulty and that it may misrecognize both the differences and the similarities between the heretic and itself. The church, as Engels maintained, may very well think that it is punishing erroneous beliefs and practices when in fact it punishes a group of people whose objective class position poses a threat to its own material interests.¹⁰⁸

Heterodoxy/the heretic: A designation conferred upon a person who, in the eyes of an orthodoxy, has swerved from its “natural” conception of the world. This individual’s deviation is rendered more alarming by the fact that he or she is perceived to be a member of the group. The orthodoxy’s perception that the heretic belongs, or once belonged, may obscure the fact that the heretic is, or was, in some way different. Sociologically speaking, then, a heretic is a deviant who is objectively subordinate and subjectively “one of us.” In terms of the types of activities that the heretic engages in, he or she may (1) discover and contest some concealed “truth” that buttresses orthodox domination (i.e., *doxa*) or (2) reorder a dominant discourse so as to expose its “contradictory dialectical meanings.”¹⁰⁹ An element of danger is always associated with this person insofar as his or her actions may, intentionally or unintentionally, benefit the adversaries of the orthodoxy. We might add, then, a third possibility: a heretic is someone who says things that only “our” enemies say. We need not, however, insist that the heretic always actively solicits or deserves his or her persecution. It is entirely possible, and sociologically accurate, to say that the heretic is simply one who has run afoul of the orthodoxy.

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¹⁰⁸ Bourdieu, however, contests Engels’s reading (“Genesis,” p. 15).

¹⁰⁹ Zito (n. 3 above), p. 129; Bourdieu who, as noted above, equates prophecy with heresy, makes a similar argument when he suggests that “prophetic discourse contains almost nothing that is not part of prior tradition” (“Genesis,” p. 35).