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the conceptus in any proper sense a person (and so the *kind* of thing to which the respect proper to all persons is owed)?—there is not one essay arguing Yes, *though there are four of them arguing No*. Some will suspect that this is a case of bias toppling over into malice. There is, however, a more charitable explanation.

4. The editors seem ignorant of much current philosophical writing on abortion. Though (to their credit) they reprint John T. Wilcox's powerful essay, "Nature as Demonic in Thomson's Defense of Abortion," they pass over completely the work of Benedict Ashley, Francis Beckwith,

Germain Grisez, Stephen Schwarz, and Celia Wolf-Devine—all of whom have advanced the argument far beyond the level of the pieces Bairn and Rosenbaum have found worthy to assemble. Editorial and scholarly failure can rarely have been displayed on a grander scale.

For many years, there has been an almost desperate need for a good—even a decent—collection of essays on the morality of abortion. There still is.

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SCIENCE, KNOWLEDGE, AND MIND: A STUDY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF C.S. PEIRCE. By C. F. Delaney. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1993. Pp. xii + 183. \$28.95.

C.F. Delaney has written a concise and compact book on central elements in Peirce's conception of the scientific enterprise and its attendant connections with the philosophy of mind and epistemology. One of the virtues of this book is its insistence that Peirce, unlike many contemporary thinkers, refused to separate these three areas of inquiry and struggled to unify them under a general evolutionary metaphysics that correlated mind to nature in a unique form of objective idealism. Delaney is convinced, quite rightly, that this general conceptual structure can serve to move contemporary debate on issues such as "realism" in more helpful directions. He also takes pains to rescue Peirce from fashionable neopragmatists who profoundly distort his framework by stripping it of its critical-commonsensism and its belief in the eventual convergence of human knowledge

with the tendency of independent and dynamic objects to become more and more manifest to inquiry in time.

The first part of the book delves into Peirce's theories of scientific method, with particular attention to the roles of induction and abduction in shaping a social and self-corrective enterprise that moves to sharpen the vague ideas of common sense so that they can be transformed to deal with more abstract and generic structures of interaction. While abduction (retroduction) postulates general laws to explain the existence and structure of a given case, induction works to falsify any such claims insofar as they cannot deliver reliable predictions about a class of such cases. He shows that induction is more than the mere enumeration of samples but moves to falsify or confirm abductive claims against the test of future experience. Delaney traces this correlation be-

tween these two methods with precision and subtlety. At the same time, he shows how deduction works to clarify and strengthen categorial structures within science.

The scientific enterprise, like any other evolutionary 'organism' must work economically as it moves through a seeming infinity of abductive and hypothetical possibilities. Delaney points out that Peirce wanted to find, in Delaney's words, "the best possible cognitive return on our investment," [18] so that we should start with the simplest and most likely abductions first. There is a kind of cost benefit analysis at the heart of science that refers both to the resources of the community and to the resources of what could be called a 'hypothesis bank.' Even though we may posit the infinite long run as the ultimate guarantor of our abductions, here and now we must let common sense and our already established habits help us in hypothesis selection.

Delaney is careful to remind us that even with the strong emphasis on generic-level analysis, Peirce returns again and again to the brute facticity of perception. Scientific progress can be measured in terms of the ability of generals to find a home in our basic perceptual structures, even while moving beyond them into the counterfactual domain of the "would be." Delaney gives a wonderfully concise summation of Peirce's basic commitments in the philosophy of science:

In the classical spirit he maintains (1) that the aim of science is objectivity and truth, (2) that there is a specifically characterizable scientific method, and (3) that this method defines the paradigmatic case of rational cognitive behavior. He also holds (4) that the history of science

exhibits progress toward objectivity and truth, and (5) that there is a logic of scientific inquiry that provides a rationale for this progress. But he also goes on to insist that scientific inquiry is (6) informed by interests, (7) structured by norms, and (8) driven by certain ineliminable moral factors and social ideals. Added to these features are (9) a causal-evolutionary account of scientific insight and (10) a fundamentally economic characterization of theory acceptance. [79]

Delaney works through all ten of these dimensions of Peirce's account and makes a very strong case for each. This is done in the context of Peirce's rejection of nominalism and his affirmation of the post-Kantian account of how experience shapes percepts through perceptual judgments (remembering that experience is a much broader category than perception).

The second part of the book is a masterful analysis of Peirce's deconstruction of Cartesianism. Delaney focuses on four aspects of Descartes' stated and implied program: methodism, foundationalism, internalism, and individualism. Peirce's 1868 *Journal of Speculative Philosophy* essays are explored and their complex fabric is teased out in the analysis. Delaney gives one of the most concise accounts that I have seen of Peirce's deconstruction of intuitionism, that is, of the belief that we can have immediate and non-mediated givens of experience that are indubitable. Yet Delaney is also aware of the incompleteness of Peirce's critique. He shows that the famous example of the inverted triangle suspended in water (from the 1868 essay *Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man*), where

the apex of the triangle represents the object external to the mind, relies on an analogy from his theory of continuity that does not do justice to the epistemic situation. The question that the example addresses is whether or not we can have anything like a first sign or a first impression in a series. As we withdraw the triangle from the water we can also draw yet one more horizontal line on its emerging surface, each line representing a percept or a sign. Can we ever find a final line? If we stress becoming and continuity, we cannot. Yet this, as noted, relies on an analogy from one order of reality, the mathematical, making sense in another order, namely, in the domain of finite human experience or perception.

The second section concludes with a clear analysis of the problems involved in Peirce's distinctions among the percept, the perceptual judgment (an unconscious and evolutionarily based predication), and the percipuum. For someone desiring a brief and accurate analysis of this complex network, this section is of great value.

The third section details Peirce's conception of mind, shying away from a full semiotic analysis, but showing how the dialogic model of thought enters into his conception of mind. The mind is itself a product of inferences, starting with ignorance and error in the child, and evolving into an indirect but expansive form of self-consciousness in the adult. Peirce denies anything like pure introspection, preferring to see the mind as a product of sign series in collision and cooperation. Peirce avoids mind body dualism by privileging mind and assuming that all material objects are forms of deadened mind. This pansychism becomes more and more

pronounced as Peirce moves into the 1880's.

In his concluding chapter, Delaney takes the so-called "new positivism" and the "new criticism" to task for their inability to understand either science or, where pertinent, the thought of Peirce. The new positivism insists that philosophy will continue to devolve into the particular sciences and eventually cease to exist as a separate enterprise. In this conception, there is no attempt to correlate the vague world of value, habit, and experience with the more refined world of science. At the other extreme, the new criticism, a species of historicism, deconstructs all general claims by insisting that they are mere perspectives that can have no extra-horizontal warrant. Peirce's conception of science steers between these extremes by insisting that science and philosophy exist in an ever expanding dialectic. Mere perspectivalism ignores secondness, that is, the dyadic presence of brute facts of perception, and presupposes a broken-backed form of thirdness.

The positive upshot of Peirce's conception of science, knowledge, and mind, is that it gives us an evolutionary perspective that is sensitive to difference, while insisting on some form of ideal convergence for our knowledge claims. Peirce's realism is anything but naive, and has a suppleness that strongly recommends itself to contemporary thought.

My own reading of Peirce moves in a somewhat different direction, stressing his pansemioticism, his irrationalism (in the category of firstness), his belief in a collective unconscious, his radical but tragically incomplete conception of an evolving and finite God, his unique conception

of the self-fissuring of the infinitesimals, and his implied ecstatic naturalism. Yet I find Delaney's precise and masterful account of mind, knowledge, and method in Peirce highly compelling. Here is clearly the work of a scholar who has lived with these texts for a long time and who has seen their unfading power without becoming blind to their flaws. At the same time, Delaney has a healthy

architectonic sense and shows how these three areas of inquiry connect in terms of Peirce's categories and his semiotics. The community of Peirce scholars is fortunate in having this balanced and subtle account from the hand of a master interpreter.

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THE METAPHYSICS OF BEING OF ST. THOMAS IN A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE. By Leo J. Elders, S.V.D. Leiden, The Netherlands: E.J. Brill, 1993. Pp. viii + 317 with index. \$85.75. U.S.

This book "... is intended as an introduction for those who wish to become acquainted with Aquinas' doctrine of being." [vii] In his "Introduction," Elders explains that the proper content of metaphysics is "... being (*ens*) as common to all things (*ens commune*)." [14] The proper starting point of metaphysics provides a special problem: Elders disagrees with the Gilsonian position which holds that Aquinas' doctrine of being "... is dependent on Revelation." [25] Nevertheless, Elders does believe that, for Aquinas, "... the insight into the existence of immaterial things [is] a condition for entrance into and the exercise of metaphysics." [18-19] In the twenty chapters which comprise the rest of the book, Elders explains various metaphysical issues in Aquinas and offers a critical appraisal of several views which pre-date and post-date Aquinas in the history of philosophy.

"To be", writes Elders in Chapter One, does not simply mean "to be real" or "to be present", but "... signifies the dynamic source and principle which makes real whatever is demanded by the essence of the subject it actualizes." [37] Being, furthermore, is the

first concept apprehended by the intellect. According to Elders, our direct grasp of being "... excludes all doubt about what is immediately perceived" and thus implies that "... the position of critical realism is untenable." [39]

Chapter Two provides a history of the transcendental concepts up to the time of Aquinas, as well as a discussion of Aquinas' own derivation of the transcendentals in *De Veritate*. In Chapter Three, Elders discusses the theory of the transcendental concepts from Scotus to Sartre. According to Elders, Scotus failed to acknowledge the analogy of being, and because of this "... Scotus' system tends to cut being loose from its properties." [65] This tendency, according to Elders, is later manifested in the thought of Kant and others who give priority to our consciousness of being instead of being itself.

The next major section of the book, encompassing Chapters Four through Nine, provides a more detailed analysis of the transcendentals. According to Elders, the transcendental concept of "thing" (*res*) is derived from the fact that "... one may add to being a general positive