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ANGLICAN THEOLOGICAL REVIEW
Being and Faith: Sein und Zeit and Luther

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In Luther's turn toward faith as the greatest work, and in Heidegger's turn toward the primacy of die Seinsfrage (the question of being), a common understanding of Being and Faith has been inaugurated. In his struggles with the categorial structures of late medieval nominalism, Luther brought theology into the center of the movement of faith as that faith drove beyond categorial architechtonic toward the abyss of the common understanding of Being and Faith has been inaugurated. In his Luther brought theology into the center of the movement of faith as that theory, Heidegger attempted to move philosophy back toward that originating thinking which provided the measure for the invasion of Being into human Dasein. Both thinkers felt called to enter into the draft or lure of a measure that would locate theology and philosophy in an order in which a response would emerge out of a deepened sense of the gift of that which is to be thought. This relocating of reflective response was itself made possible by a deepened sense of the nature of authentic temporalizing. The common origin for this rethinking can be traced back to St. Paul's understanding of eschatological time in the period of the primitive church. In what follows, I will work through these notions in order to find that would carry out Husserl's program of articulating categorial intuitions into phenomenal structures. At the same time, the problematic turned into the inner logic of faith and its relation to theology and Luther appropriated the world and its structures. At the same time, the problematic turned into the fifth chapter of 1 Thessalonians where the non-chronological concept of time is articulated. Thomas Sheehan gives this succinct account of the Pauline conception that fascinated Heidegger:

I certainly did not bring a sufficient understanding to Heidegger's analysis of the "hermeneutic situation," here employed as an introduction to a philosophical interpretation of Aristotle. But then the discussion in this paper was about the young Luther, about Gabriel Biel and Peter of Lombard, about Augustine and Paul. That Aristotle came into view precisely in this manner, that a highly unusual language was being used, that the talk was carried out in terms like "Um-zu" (in order to), that it was about the "Wurszinn" (as to what) and that the "Vorgriffs" (preconception) and the "Durchgriffs" (reaching through)—things like these remain in my memory to this day. They broke through to me. This was no mere learned doing moved by a historical problematic. The whole of Aristotle then assumed an importance for me, and when I received my first introduction to Heidegger in Freiburg, my eyes opened wide.1

Gadamer goes on to relate how Heidegger struggled toward a language that would carry out Husserl's program of articulating categorial intuitions into phenomenal structures. At the same time, the problematic turned toward the primary fore-structures that provided the categorial and experiential clearings for these phenomena. In particular, Heidegger became interested in the Pauline understanding of fulfilled time as it contrasts to the chronological time constituted by an endless series of now-points. Specifically, he probed into the fifth chapter of 1 Thessalonians where the non-chronological concept of time is articulated. Thomas Sheehan gives this succinct account of the Pauline conception that fascinated Heidegger:

The eschatological thrust of early Christianity, the expectation of the Parousia, opens up an absolutely unique understanding of time wherein all questions of "when" are transposed from chronology into the "moment of insight" (kairos, Augenblick). The question of when the Parousia will occur is not answered by reference to objective time but is referred back to factual lived experience and becomes a matter of the way a man leads his life. . . . The question of the "when" of the Parousia reduces back to the question of the "how" of authentic living.2

The primitive church faced the problem of the delayed parousia and was driven to rethink the correlation between the promise of the divine reappearace and the relentless temporal flow of chronological time that seemed to mock that very return. Paul's own eschatological reflections matured within this historical pressure to redefine the possible meaning of the Presence, of the Advent or the Being-with. The fateful delay of the parousia gave rise to the notion of the kairos as the fulfilled time in which the human/divine correspondence would be established anew. The apocalyptic overtones of the Advent were replaced with the eschatological moment in which a qualitatively unique time or temporality would stand

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above and before the communities of the primitive church. In this transformation of temporality, Paul strove to relate time to that inner transformation of the faithful which would inaugurate a sanctified life.

Heidegger's early and continued interest in both Roman Catholic and Protestant theology shaped the ways in which he formulated the essential problematic of philosophy. In implicit and explicit dialogue with the perspectives of Barth and Tillich, he struggled to redefine fundamental ontology against the backdrop of a prethematic and largely Protestant understanding of faith. By the mid 1920s he had come to understand the experience of faith outside its articulation in Christian dogmatics. In his *Sein und Zeit* (translated as *Being and Time*), Heidegger makes this revealing statement:

"Theology is seeking a more primordial interpretation of man's Being toward God, prescribed by the very meaning of faith itself and remaining within it. It is slowly beginning to understand once more Luther's insight that the 'foundation' on which its system of dogma rests has not arisen from an inquiry in which faith is primary, and that conceptually this 'foundation' not only is inadequate for the problematic of theology, but conceals and distorts it."

By analogy, philosophy, in its forgetfulness of the question of the meaning of Being, has failed to examine the foundation of its thematic articulation of beings and their regional structures. Luther's retrieval of the internal problematic of faith serves as a prototype for that fundamental ontology which wishes to open out the other side of the ontological difference and regain an understanding of Being. But the type of philosophy envisioned by Heidegger cannot ground itself in theological dogmatics but conceals and distorts it.

The categories elucidated in *Being and Time* attempt to exhibit the full contour of the human process as it finds itself in a world of thematic and prethematic involvements. Heidegger's detailed analyses of the structures of the person, the "in" relation, the modes of temporality, being-toward-death, and authentic verses inauthentic existence all point toward a renewed understanding of the opening provided by Being in its manifestation as Time. In calling his basic categories "existentials" (*Existenzialen*) he wishes to demarcate them from those categories which apply to non-human complexes. The existential analytic is thus focused on the logic and meaning of the human process as it finds itself within the worldliness of the world. From out of this analysis comes the central concern with what the philosopher would call the analogue to faith, namely, authentic human existence.

In what follows I will work through the more important existentials in order to clarify the ways in which Heidegger reframes the problematic of fundamental ontology. This in turn will make it possible to shed light on the ways in which Heidegger's study of the human process make it possible to find a new grounding for the movement of faith. Of initial concern is the problem of the modes of temporality and their relation to our various worldly involvements.

For the Heidegger of *Sein und Zeit*, the three ecstases of temporality (*Zettlichkeit*) serve to open out human *Dasein* into its involvement with the world of the ready-to-hand (*zurhanden*) and, in the secondary form of distancing, the present-at-hand (*vornehmend*). Through the totality of involvements manifest in the dealings with the equipollent totality of the ready-to-hand, the *Dasein* moves outward toward a grasp of the phenomenon of worldhood in general. Worldhood as a primary phenomenon gets closed off and eclipsed through inauthentic dealings that fail to grasp the full reality of referentiality that is tied to the ready-to-hand and its web of involvements. The understanding works through involvements toward worldhood:

"The "wherein" of an act of understanding which assigns or refers itself, is that for which one lets entities be encountered in the kind of Being that belongs to our various worldly involvements. The existential analytic is thus focused on the logic and meaning of the human process as it finds itself within the worldliness of the world. From out of this analysis comes the central concern with what the philosopher would call the analogue to faith, namely, authentic human existence."

These involvements are only sustained and articulated by the temporalizing that opens out the *Dasein* to the very possibility of encountering a totality. The "situation" serves as the mobile region within which the *Dasein* can disclose worldhood in its plenitude.

In inauthentic existence, the *Dasein* is caught in a falling movement that threatens to pull in the arching power of temporality. The authentic experience of anticipation (*vorlaufend*) becomes reduced to mere awaiting, which has no resolute openness toward death. The power of the moment of vision (*Augenblick*) collapses into the inauthentic present, which functions to make present that which is without full referentiality and worldhood. The authentic repetition (*Wiederholung*) of possibilities falls prey to a deadening remembering in which the factual past becomes the locus of a torturing process of the irrevocable. In each case, the inauthentic
Dasein suffers from distanitality, averageness, and a levelling down in which temporality flattens itself into the banal reiteration of a series of now-points.

Inauthentic Dasein rescues itself from the demise of temporality through that anticipatory resoluteness which lets the power of death shatter the complacency of its lostness in the they-self. The Dasein anticipates the possibility of the impossibility of Being-in-the-world and lets that ownmost possibility become its moment of foundering in which its immersion in the they-self is rejected. For Heidegger, "anticipation discloses to existence that its uttermost possibility lies in giving itself up, and thus it shatters all one's tenaciousness to whatever existence one has reached."6 Authentic temporalizing drives the Dasein beyond its perpetual falling into the levelling chitchat (Gerede), curiosity (Neugier), and ambiguity (Zweideutigkeit) of the they-self. Anticipatory resoluteness unifies the self around its ownmost death and breaks open past and present in a new manner.

The present becomes the locus of the disclosure of the situation that surrounds the Dasein. Heidegger states:

When resolute, Dasein has brought itself back from falling, and has done so precisely in order to be more authentically 'there' in the 'moment of vision' (Augenblick) as regards the Situation which has been disclosed.7

The richness of the totality of involvements, which themselves push outward toward the worldhood of the world, emerges in the true moment of vision in which resoluteness finds its context for concernful dealings with the world and with other selves. Authentic temporalizing saves the present from a stagnated life of mere presentation. Authentic temporalizing explodes the encircling power of the they-self and frees the Dasein for its ownmost self-capturing in the future. Care, as the pre-temporal unity of the self, lifts its sights beyond the concernful dealings with the immediate and local and strives toward a proper unification of vision in which resoluteness finds its context for concernful dealings with the world and with other selves. Authentic temporalizing unifies the self around its ownmost death and breaks open past and present in a new manner.

The future becomes the ecstasis of temporality that vivifies and articulates past and present. Ironically, this future carries with it the realization that nullity awaits the authentic Dasein as its highest possibility:

The ecstatic character of the primordial future lies precisely in the fact that the future closes one's potentiality-for-being, that is to say, the future itself is closed to one, and as such it makes possible the resolute existentiell understanding of nullity. Primordial and authentic coming-towards-one-self is the meaning of existing in one's ownmost nullity.8

Death stands before the Dasein as the not-to-be-outstripped possibility that carries within its darkening core the reaffirmation of possibility itself. The possibility of genuine self-capturing pushes backward from nullity in order to relocate the end "inside" the now resolute will.

The mystery of the end (as fulfillment and closure) becomes the gateway for the unveiling of the light of Being, which replaces the they-self as the lure and origin of human dwelling. The Dasein's lostness in the world is overcome, if only for a brief time. Constitutive of this transformation is the experience of the slowing down of temporality:

But when Dasein goes in for something in the reticence of carrying it through or even of genuinely breaking down on it, its time is a different time and, as seen by the public, an essentially slower time than that of idle talk, which 'lives at a faster rate.' Idle talk will thus long since have gone on to something else which is currently the very newest thing.9

Chronological time carries itself forward with an unrelenting pace that spins off novel encounters in an ever-accelerating trajectory. When the Dasein founders on something that cannot be thought through at this pace, the matter to be thought acts as a resistance that slows the temporal process itself. The resistance of that which is not seizable through idle talk increases until language itself suffers shipwreck.

The referential structures of the ready-to-hand offer resistance whenever a broken, missing, or inappropriate piece of equipment intrudes into
the movement of circumspective concern. The gap left by this intrusion calls for a transformation of the context of involvements such that the opening is once again closed. In this order, resistance is crucial to the articulation of the phenomenon of worldhood and to the secondary delineation of the traits of the present-at-hand. Yet the readjustment of an equipmental totality does not produce the more crucial founndering that can only come when the Dasein finds its own Being-toward-death as the clearing within which Being may come to appearance.

The higher resistance emerges out of that which is covered up. Being, as the hidden lure within and around worldhood, resists this veiling, which pushes the power back into the abyss from which metaphysics emerges as the triumphal denial of the light within which it too must appear. In a sense, Being must wear a disguise:

Yet that which remains hidden in a egregious sense, or which relapses and gets covered up again, or which shows itself only in disguise, is not just this entity or that, but rather the Being of entities, as our previous observations have shown. This Being can be covered up so extensively that it becomes forgotten and no question arises about it or about its meaning. If metaphysics, as the general categorial articulation of beings as beings, is the shadow of Being, then the resistance offered up by Being shakes onto-theology to its roots. In this shaking, the ground in which these roots lie buried emerges in its purity. The Dasein founders on that which is hidden and in its founndering allows Being to appear through the veil of its ownmost Being-toward-death. Radical temporalizing provides the clearing within which the hidden can return.

Being resists being measured by the regional ontologies that sustain the Dasein in its drive toward intelligibility. As a measureless measure, Being lures the inauthentic self toward that shattering which brings death into proximity. Anticipation holds the Dasein open for that light which appears through the abyss of no-longer-Being-in-the-world. What were once the glories of the they-self become the forgotten illusions of the authentic self.

Heidegger's language, especially in his publications from the 1920s, is strikingly theological. His movement from traditional Catholic (even Scholastic) categories toward the delineation of the faith-experience in Dasein finds its own Being-toward-death as the clearing through which worldhood enters into a way of thinking that lifts circum­pection beyond the ready-to-hand toward both worldhood and the Being that emerges out of the "other side" of worldhood. Faith is the response to a prior revelation and has nothing to do with those beliefs which pertain to ontic and ontological structures. Being inverts the relation between self and world by both humbling and sustaining the Dasein as the clearing through which worldhood appears. Writing in 1517, Martin Luther evokes the same reality when he distinguishes between God and man from the standpoint of Being and nothing:

It is the nature of God that he makes something out of nothing. Consequently, if someone is not nothing, God can make nothing out of him. Men make something into something else. But this is a vain and useless work. Thus God accepts no one or religious terms), anxiety as the openness to that which is not a being but somehow negates beings as a whole, and the priority of being-called toward an authentic existence in which the Dasein's relation to a non-determinate reality is established. Hans Jonas, in a carefully studied critique of Heidegger's relation to theology, points out those elements in his project which have appealed to Christian thinkers:

First then, on the count of affinity, the appeal of Heidegger's thought, at least of his language, to the Christian theologian cannot be denied. He brings to the fore precisely what the philosophical tradition had ignored or withheld—the moment of call over against that of form, of mission over against presence, of being grasped over against surveying, of event over against object, of response over against concept, even the humility of reception over against the pride of autonomous reason, and generally the stance of piety over against the self-assertion of the subject.

These categorial and existential shifts derive at least part of their appeal from their historical echo of that kind of non-objectifying thinking which marked Luther's efforts to find a binding understanding of the faith-experience as lived through in the moment of decision. Heidegger's understanding of the relation between the Dasein and the Being that sustains it runs parallel to Luther's understanding of the movement of faith toward that divine love which overcomes divine wrath. Further, Heidegger's defense of a unique type of non-metaphysical thinking recalls the Christian understanding of revelation and its relation to human experience. Jonas states, "But since Heidegger, too, speaks of revelation, viz., of the self-unveiling of Being, these two—revelation-dependent and "primal" thinking—seem to be compatible, even identical." The Dasein enters into a way of thinking that lifts circum­pection beyond the ready-to-hand toward both worldhood and the Being that emerges out of the "other side" of worldhood. Faith is the response to a prior revelation and has nothing to do with those beliefs which pertain to ontic and ontological structures.

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11 Ibid., 59.
13 Ibid., 212.
14 Ibid., 212.
except the abandoned, makes no one healthy except the sick, gives no one sight except the blind, brings no one to life except the dead, makes no one pious except sinners, makes no one wise except the foolish, and, in short, has mercy upon no one except the wicked, and gives no one grace except those who have not grace. 15

Leaving aside the personification of God as an agent, one can see clearly that Luther envisions the divine as operating on the other side of that shipwreck which empties the Dasein of its fullness in the they-self. God stands as the resistance to the self in its drive toward self-sufficiency. The humbling of the self is not and cannot be an act of the self in its isolation. For Luther, divine wrath serves as the entrance into that state of utter abandonment which prepares the way for divine love.

The person without faith is like the inauthentic Dasein who creates an idolatry of beings to blot out the reality of the ontological difference. In his "Disputation Against Scholastic Theology" of 1517, Luther gives his own succinct statement of the human propensity to forget the ontological difference: "Man is by nature unable to want God to be God. Indeed, he himself wants to be God, and does not want God to be God." 16 Human will is under bondage to beings and is idolatrous in its very thinking of God. The absolute abyss of the divine nature is suppressed so that finite gods can enter the free-space of the holy and serve out their roles as guarantors of an illusory human security.

Luther worked through both sides of the difference between Being and beings or God and the created. His oftimes paradoxical accounts of free will are designed to show how finite self-will attunes itself to the reality of the difference. In his essay "The Freedom of a Christian," written in 1520, he states, "A Christian is a perfectly free lord of all, subject to none. A Christian is a perfectly dutiful servant of all, subject to all." 17 This paradox emerges out of the very heart of the ontological difference. The world and its powers, to use Paul's formulation, form the guarantors of an illusory human security.

For Luther, God prevails in the mysterious dialectic in which its hidden nature is in tension with its utter ubiquity. No being-thing can prevail unless it is sustained by the supernatural power of the divine. This power secures the created orders against bifurcation and decay. Ironically, however, this experience of God's omnipresence is only possible through a sustained meditation on God's hiddenness in the supposed tragedy of the cross.

...Therefore the friends of the cross say that the cross is good and works are evil, for through the cross works are destroyed and the old Adam, who is especially edified by works, is crucified. It is impossible for a person not to be puffed up by his good works unless he has first been deflated and destroyed by suffering and evil until he knows that he is worthless and that his works are not his but God's. 19

God is hidden in the suffering servant, who carries the majesty of the Godhead in his person. The cross stands at the center of the ontological difference, serving as the event of appropriation that keeps both poles of the difference open to each other in the round dance of apportionment. The triumphal God of human inauthenticity is broken on the cross, which swallows up all categorial projections. Only when God has become utterly hidden in the symbol of the cross can the abyss of the divine nature begin to reappear.

Human works founder on the mystery of the cross and must become inverted if they are to attain validation in the social orders. Faith is itself a work but of a higher order, and it forms the measure through and by which all other works are to be judged. The mystery and the power of the ontological difference coexist in the symbol of the cross, which crucifies the inauthentic self. At the same time, the cross, as the event of appropriation, propels the self outward into the eschatological kingdom where the Being of God can help the self to overcome its own nullity.

For Luther, God prevails in the mysterious dialectic in which its hidden nature is in tension with its utter ubiquity. No being-thing can prevail unless it is sustained by the supernatural power of the divine. This power secures the created orders against bifurcation and decay.
There is no guarantee that the power of the expectation will emerge. This is a quite different idea, in which existent being is contemplated not simply as timelessly present, but is seen as the apostle sees it, as creation full of desiring what now is, and reaching out with longing towards what does not yet exist. It is only with regard to their existence in time that creatures can be regarded as creatures.20

There is no guarantee that the power of the expectation will emerge triumphant over the inertia and idolatry of the created orders. Luther would firmly reject any social gospel that spoke of the emergence of the creation: as timelessly present, but is seen as the apostle sees it, as creation full of despising what now is, and reaching out with longing towards what does not yet exist. It is only with regard to their existence in time that creatures can be regarded as creatures.20

Luther scholar Gerhard Ebeling sees a striking similarity between Paul’s porality. Luther scholar Gerhard Ebeling sees a striking similarity between Paul and Luther in their conceptions of the new temporality and its relation to creation:

This is a quite different idea, in which existent being is contemplated not simply as timelessly present, but is seen as the apostle sees it, as creation full of expectation, sighing and pregnant with the future, taken up itself into the process of despising what now is, and reaching out with longing towards what does not yet exist. It is only with regard to their existence in time that creatures can be regarded as creatures.20

There is no guarantee that the power of the expectation will emerge triumphant over the inertia and idolatry of the created orders. Luther would firmly reject any social gospel that spoke of the emergence of the kingdom in evolutionary or progressivist terms. Yet he would also reject those extreme versions of his own two-kingsdoms doctrine which would radically separate creation and the eschatological kingdom. The cross holds both kingdoms in a tension-filled embrace in which the power of radical expectation moves fitfully on the fringes of kairos-temporality.

The theologian of glory wishes to stand before God on the basis of his or her own ethical achievements. The divine majesty and power become projected ciphers of human aspirations and an implicit idolatry. The theologian of the cross realizes that God’s grace can only come through the suffering of that death which negates the triumphal affirmations of human reason. Luther’s sustained critiques of Aristotelian stem not only from his critique of nominalism but also from his understanding of the cross as the ultimate stumbling-block for reason and finite human will.

While reason serves the theology of glory, faith is born in the theology of the cross. Faith is not a product of man’s search for God but can only exist as a response to the offer of grace. And this offer can only be seen in the cross, which preserves the ontological difference in its freedom and openness. Grace is not a habit (habitus) that can be acquired or even cultivated. It is an infused power that underlies all of the Aristotelian virtues and locates them in a hierarchy that the habits themselves cannot comprehend. The faith that emerges as a response to grace does not convey any ontic or ontological knowledge about the constitution of the world or its complexes. Rather, it serves to open the self to the reality of the ontological difference hidden in the cross.

It must be clearly and unambiguously understood that the "Being" of Heidegger is with the "ontological difference," inside the bracket with which theology must bracket in the totality of the created world. The Being whose fate Heidegger ponders is the quintessence of this world, it is saeculum. Against this, theology should guard the radical transcendence of its God, whose voice comes not out of Being but breaks into the kingdom of Being from without.22

Philosophy honors the ontological difference but stays within the world and its structures. Being is never manifest without beings and remains bound to the immanent. God, especially as expressed in the eschatological kingdom, breaks into the world and functions at a point "beneath" the ontological difference. In a very real sense, God stands as the transcendent measure for the difference between beings and Being. Luther’s problematic moves thought beyond the structures of Sein und Zeit even though those very structures derive much of their power and appeal from the Reformer’s presentation of the movement of faith. While both thinkers struggled toward the measure that would ground the ontological difference in something more primordial, they in turn failed to

20 Ebeling, Luther. 88f.
21 For a succinct account of how faith conceals us in God, see Paul Althaus, The Theology of Martin Luther (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1966).
to understand the inner logic of the temporal categories derived from Paul.

For both Luther and Heidegger, the opening to this measure is found in the fulfilled time of the kairos. Eschatological time is the unique temporality that sustains the complex interrelations between the kingdom of God and the orders of the world. Paul Tillich, an heir to the tradition of Paul, Luther, and Heidegger, exhibits the crucial traits of this temporalizing:

Through the concept of the kairos, it (religious socialism) has attempted to clarify the limits as well as the validity and meaning of concrete expectation. Expectation as such, expectation as a human attitude, comes into being in terms of a definite content of expectation pertinent to a particular time. Expectation is always bound to the concrete, and at the same time transcends every instance of the concrete. It possesses a content that is dependent on the spiritual or social group involved, yet it transcends this content. The vitality and depth of socialist faith lies in the fact that it so distinctly—and dangerously—embodies this tension. For the most pernicious posture one can assume is that of expectation.23

The dialectic between the particular and the transcendent power of the kingdom is preserved in Tillich's reformulation of the kairos. Human nature is itself remade under the internal pressure of creative expectation. The measure for anthropology is the theological experience of the fulfilled time which stands over chronological time. The new person is not possible outside of the in-breaking of the expectation, which produces a foundering for the old self. The political dimension of kairological time emerges with far greater clarity in Tillich's formulation than in the writings of Heidegger. The correlation between time and religious socialism becomes the core of the new perspective. Within the orders and powers of the world, the person in search of authenticity must experience what Luther called Anfechtung, which literally means "to be fought at."24 God stands as the fencing master who lunges at the unsuspecting soul in search of faith. The anxiety and temptation involved in the experience of Anfechtung stand as marks of the impending offer of grace. Luther's acute sensitivity to the inner core of Angst provides a phenomenological fore-structure for the analysis of faith. On a social level, the experience of a communal Anfechtung prepares the way for the in-breaking of the eschatological lure that moves the community toward radical justice. This in-breaking can be neither predicted nor induced by acts of finite will. It can be creatively awaited whenever the idols of the social order are released into the gathering storm of the impending kairos. The myths of origin must be measured by the deeper reality of the expectation, which prevents the gods of space from conquering the liberating power of time.

The primordial time sought by these thinkers is related to the inner movement of faith and that kind of thinking which is appropriated to Being. Before discussing the relation between Being and God, we must advance further in our understanding of Being and faith.

When human temporality is understood in terms of anticipation, Heidegger's vorlauf en, it is recognized that the future is that mode of time which breaks open the self for the self. Radical temporalizing is a throwing-opening-clearing in which world and self become a counter-opening to the light of Being. The authentic Dasein must run alongside this throwing-opening-clearing if it is to experience the shattering of its they-self. Faith, as the deepening of authentic existence, emerges on the other side of that resoluteness (Entschlossenheit) which drives toward unity. The offer of grace appears from out of the mystery of the kairos, which is an essentially social temporality exhibiting justice and judgment. Unlike the authentic Dasein of Sein und Zeit, the person of faith has been lifted into the gathering storm of social expectation and has left both the the-self and the merely authentic self behind. Faith sublates resoluteness into the more fundamental reality of a response to the in-breaking of radical expectation. Yet this social expectation is guarded against demonic distortion by the very power of the kairos, which precludes the idolatry of any given order or power. The merely finite is shriven of its hubris and broken open to the infinite, which may appear through it. At no time is the finite allowed to usurp the measure that governs it.

Within the orders and powers of the world, the person in search of authenticity must experience what Luther called Anfechtung, which literally means "to be fought at."24 God stands as the fencing master who lunges at the unsuspecting soul in search of faith. The anxiety and temptation involved in the experience of Anfechtung stand as marks of the impending offer of grace. Luther's acute sensitivity to the inner core of Angst provides a phenomenological fore-structure for the analysis of faith. On a social level, the experience of a communal Anfechtung prepares the way for the in-breaking of the eschatological lure that moves the community toward radical justice. This in-breaking can be neither

24 For a lively discussion of Luther's encounter with the experience of Anfechtung, see Eric W. Cretsch, Martin—God's Court Jester: Luther in Retrospect (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1993). My translation of Anfechtung is derived from his analysis.
so far as theology speaks from out of the thankful response to unearned grace, it can serve to provide a categorial clearing onto the divine in its several natures. We will conclude with a preliminary evocation of these divine natures.

God cannot be equated with Being even though Being is one of the manifestations of God’s full plenitude. Neither can it be asserted that God is simple or without subaltern traits or components. Whatever is, is complex, this applies to the divine as well. God occupies several orders and has order-specific traits. For Tillich, God is the ground of Being. This notion, taken strictly, is neither purely symbolic nor literal. It occupies a position between both possibilities. He goes on to deny that God is a person and insists, instead, that God is the ground of personality. This outflanking of anthropomorphism is crucial to any articulation of the divine natures that is to be binding in the light of our previous reflections.

In agreement with Tillich, we can assert that Being is one of the expressions of God’s divine plenitude. The sheer prevalence of the world is the most pervasive and eternal of God’s self-manifestations. God is both the emanation and the emanated, even though the power of emanation takes priority ontologically, if not temporally. Of course, the complexes of the world resist the emanating/sustaining power that ventures them forth, and this resistance limits the power of the divine.

In another of its dimensions, God is located in and consequent to the world and its powers. The divine is eternally self-surpassing in its locatedness in the orders that have resisted its sheer power of Being. This is the hidden dimension of God (deus absconditus), which is manifest in the fitful moments of kairolological time that appear before the community in its drive toward justice. This is the proper provenance of the theology of the cross. In this dimension, God occupies the nether side of the ontological difference and participates in the ramified ordinal network of the world and its powers. While the dimension of God as sheer prevalence or Being is beyond good and evil, this second dimension is active in the movement from injustice to justice. God remains masked by chronological time, which flattens out communal and personal transaction yet remains ever ready to appear within the vortex of the kairos. In this dimension, God suffers with the orders of creation/emanation and struggles with them for transparency and harmony. The divine lure cannot cause transformation but can preserve the opening within which transformations can occur.


Finally, the divine is located by that which is neither the totality of all orders nor Being as sheer prevalence. Both the divine and the world are encompassed by that which lies "beneath" the ontological difference. This actuality, perhaps best termed the "Encompassing," is that toward which the divine is under way. Parallel to the eschatological lure felt by the community is the lure of the Encompassing, which provides the opening-clearing within which the divine life can unfold and achieve its own measured transformation. The Encompassing is the only actuality not located in something of greater scope or prevalence. Its key trait is its sustained lure, which keeps the divine from self-closure or solidification.

While the world and its powers stand as the encompassing measure for human interaction, the Encompassing itself stands as that measureless measure which sustains the divine life. While we endure the dialectic of presence/absence in our dealings with God, the divine undergoes its own Anfechtung with the presence/absence of the Encompassing. The unity within the divine natures is preserved by the lure of the Encompassing, which secures the divine against its own internal diremption. Our precarious glimpses into the Encompassing itself enable us to participate in God's eternal self-overcoming. Through this participation we are gathered into the mystery that speaks from the heart of the ontological difference.