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Hermeneutics and Psychopathology: Jaspers and Hillman

Robert S. Corrington
The Pennsylvania State University

The correlation between psychopathology and hermeneutics has long been at the forefront of philosophic discussion. In recent years a number of thinkers, particularly in France, have advanced the claim that all hermeneutic acts are themselves part of an intrinsic pathology which makes it impossible to arrive at neutral and binding interpretations. The so-called hermeneutics of suspicion has served to undermine those interpretive norms which guided the depth psychology coming out of Freud and Jung. The drive toward radical interiority and non-generic subjectivity has destabilized not only hermeneutics but has put the human self under an erasure which renders it powerless to find its own contour amid the exploding wealth of interpretations and signs.¹

This hermeneutic and semiotic anarchy derives its impetus from a misreading of the nature and scope of a general psychopathology. Rather than locating psychopathology under the more generic analysis of the self and its relation to the various modes of the encompassing, whether these modes pertain to the self or its world, the hermeneutics of suspicion equates psychopathology with the self in all of its dimensions. Any contrast between the authentic or inauthentic, or the normal and the abnormal, is held to impose a form of privileging on the vast fabric of a self which has no center or circumference. The epoch making work of Freud and Jung is distorted and their basic commitment to hermeneutic norms is undermined. This not only represents a profound misreading of the history of depth psychology but stands as a threat to the drive for transcendence which lives at the heart of the human self.

In strict contrast to the hermeneutics of suspicion are the writings of Karl Jaspers who struggled to find both a meaningful account of the self with its relation to transcendence and a proper understanding of psychopathology which would not exaggerate its claims nor distort its intent. In his *General Psychopathology*, revised numerous times between 1913 and 1959, Jaspers accounts for the general literature on pathology while advancing claims about the nature of the self and its struggles for authenticity and meaningful communication. He takes issue with the writings of Freud and Jung and distances himself from the general tenor of depth psychology. Jaspers maintains that the movement of *Existenz* is not quickened or deepened by those depth psychological analyses which give priority to universal unconscious structures. In particular, Jaspers takes pains to distinguish the illumination of *Existenz* from the kind of symbolic analysis carried out by Jung. Our concern in this paper will be to trace the differences between Jaspers and Jung with particular attention to the divergent hermeneutic norms applied in each case. On the one hand this will enable us to separate Jung from the hermeneutics of suspicion while on the other hand it will enable us to challenge the Jungian framework from the standpoint of Jaspers' notion of *Existenz*. Jaspers' own

perspective will be shown to represent a decisive critique of the post-modernist hermeneutics of suspicion. We will conclude with an analysis of the work of James Hillman who has moved the Jungian perspective in new directions and has thereby challenged some of the hermeneutic principles which helped to stabilize Jung's account of the archetypes. The tensions between Jaspers and Jung will be sharpened in our analysis of Hillman's archetype psychology where the tendency toward hermeneutic anarchy is increased.

Both Jaspers and Jung come out of the neo-Kantian tradition and represent different emphases within that tradition. Both sought to find those a priori structures which governed at least some dimensions of the human process. For Jaspers, the Kantian legacy is most clearly seen in his analysis of the traits of the consciousness-as-such (*Bewusstsein überhaupt*). In this general consciousness, shared by all rational beings, the fundamental explanatory categories of nature and history are embodied and expressed. For Jung, the Kantian legacy is seen in his account of the traits of the collective unconscious. Like Kant he utilized a transcendental argument which moved from the conditions and traits of the observed to the necessary enabling conditions in the realm of the unobserved. The archetypes of the collective unconscious are not themselves images nor are they in any way available to phenomenological probing. Rather, they serve as the phylogenetic conditions for the possibility of symbolic representation. As such they can only be known indirectly through the analysis and amplification of such phenomena as dreams, symbolic forms of the objective spirit, psychopathological events, and the active imagination. Jung and Jaspers agree on the necessity and priority of these universal structures even if they locate them in different domains of the self.

Jaspers argues that the general mind (consciousness-as-such) cannot be understood within the purview of psychopathology and that its fundamental contour remains unaffected by mental breakdown. He states:

The general or objective mind is currently present in social habits, ideas and communal norms, in language and in the achievements of science, poetry and art. It is also present in all our institutions. This objective mind is substantially valid and cannot fall sick. But the individual can fall sick in the way in which he partakes in it and reproduces it.²

The structures of the general mind remain valid for the human community and serve as synthetic a priori norms for communication and intelligibility. Our social involvements, which Jaspers separates from the general mind in other contexts, belong in the realm of existence (*Dasein*) and are not necessarily under the sway of the Kantian fore-structures of validation. Be that as it may, Jaspers insists that the human process partakes of universality in one of its dimensions.

Jung, as noted, locates the archetypes, his version of the synthetic a priori structures of intelligibility, within the vast evolutionary matrix of the collective unconscious. He deepens the contrast between conscious and unconscious far more than Jaspers would condone. Jung states:

The Collective unconscious contains the whole spiritual heritage of mankind's evolution, born anew in the brain structure of every

individual. His conscious mind is an ephemeral phenomenon that accomplishes all provisional adaptations and orientations, for which reason one can best compare its function to orientation in space. The unconscious, on the other hand, is the source of the instinctual forces of the psyche and of the forms or categories that regulate them, namely the archetypes. All the most powerful ideas in history go back to archetypes.³

Both instinct and image come from the archetypes which lie at the base of consciousness. Whatever universal structures obtain in the realm of consciousness derive their validation and power from the collective unconscious. Jung decentralized consciousness in order to make it a mere satellite of the eternal powers of the species-wide unconscious. This bold shift from conscious to unconscious opened up a new chapter in the history of the neo-Kantian movement. In a sense, the debate between Jaspers and Jung can be seen as a feud within a common tradition which they both share.

The realm of pathology moves outside of the Kantian structures of validation. Jaspers and Jung both argue that pathological phenomena appear whenever these Kantian structures are misappropriated by the total self in process. For Jung, pathology is teleological in nature and points toward a higher synthesis of psychic material. Any given symptom will point toward its missing or compensatory component and contain its own lines of convergence toward future consummation and totalization. For Jaspers, the self will suffer shipwreck whenever its self-regulating mechanisms fail to grasp a deeper sense of the encompassing which locates and sustains the self. To be finite is to always be in those marginal situations which remind us of our incompleteness in the face of the encompassing. Jaspers states:

Man is always in one situation or another, and all these situations are finally resolved into marginal situations, that is, certain impassable, unchangeable situations that belong to our human existence as such. In these situations mere human existence founders and awakens to *Existenz*.⁴

Shipwreck is a pervasive existential phenomenon and is not limited to pathological experiences. As a good Kantian, Jaspers stresses the boundaries of the self and locates the Absolute not within the powers and evolution of self-consciousness but in the tenuous and fitful correlation between *Existenz* and transcendence. Shipwreck is pathological whenever psychic content overwhelms the structures of the self.

The concept of limit situations, and its necessary internalization in shipwreck or foundering, occurs throughout Jaspers' writings. Its most detailed expression is in his 1932 *Philosophy* where he states:

In limit situations, each form of the leap leads me out of existence to *Existenz*—to *Existenz* as a germ enclosed in the seed, to *Existenz* as elucidating itself as possibility, to *Existenz* as actual. After the leap, my life is something other to me than by being in the sense of merely existing.⁵

In the leap from our mere social existence, our mere general consciousness, and our mere spiritual unity, we uncover the true depth dimension of the self in radical *Existenz*. This depth dimension is not to be equated with the unconscious whether personal or collective but is the gateway to transcendence in time. Jaspers rejects the notion that we must negate the structures of consciousness in order to find the deepest layer of the self.

The transition from meaningful existential shipwreck to psychotic reality, which itself inaugurates a form of shipwreck, comes from an abundance of content. Returning to *General Psychopathology* we see Jaspers state:

Finally there is the fact that in psychotic reality we find an abundance of content representing fundamental problems of philosophy: nothingness, total destruction, formlessness, death. Here the extremest of human possibilities actually breaks through the ordinary boundaries of our sheltered, calm, ordered and smooth existence. The philosopher in us cannot but be fascinated by this extraordinary reality and feel its challenge.⁶

The leap toward *Existenz* is not possible whenever psychic content dwarfs the powers of the self and shatters those boundaries which are necessary for the human process. Jaspers argues that the phenomenon of foundering can have two fundamental dimensions. On the level of *Existenz* clarification it functions to break through what Jaspers calls the "shells" of human existence. This form of foundering is the necessary opening to the power of transcendence which can only flower in and through *Existenz*. The second dimension of foundering occurs whenever the stabilities of existence, consciousness-as-such, and Spirit, fail to guide the self toward authentic self-overcoming. Like Jung, Jaspers understands psychotic breakdown to involve the increase of content over form. The formal patterns of the self cannot integrate the autonomous and oftentimes chaotic contents which emerge from outside of the normal boundaries of the self. Jaspers' careful studies of Nietzsche and Kierkegaard, as well as his analysis of Strindberg and Van Gogh, serve to remind us of these two forms of foundering and the possibilities of renewal even within the second and more destructive form of shipwreck.

To some degree, the difference between healthy and destructive shipwreck is related to the different ways in which the self can appropriate symbols. Jaspers is most critical of that dimension of Jung's perspective which pertains to the understanding of the role of symbols in the ontogenetic evolution of the human individual. In particular, he maintains that Jung falls prey to a dangerous aestheticizing tendency which bypasses the more important task of self-illumination for a self-indulgent free-play of forms and images. Jaspers states:

Symbols that do not contain a concrete reality become non-committal aesthetic contents. They are only fully symbols if they express reality. Human thinking is prone to take this symbolic reality as if it were the reality of direct apperception, so that symbols tend either to become objects of superstition (where their concreteness is mistaken for reality) or to pass as unreal (mere metaphors or symbols when measured by concrete reality itself). To live deeply rooted in

symbols is to live in a reality which as yet we do not know but can appreciate in its symbolic form. Symbols therefore are infinite, accessible to infinite interpretation and inexhaustible, but they are never reality itself as an object which we could know and possess.⁷

In the articulation and appropriation of symbols the self can fail to recognize that the referent of the symbol is non-specific. Jung erred, according to Jaspers, in deriving each major symbol from a specific archetype which stands as its hidden referent. From the Jungian perspective, each symbol has a logic and meaning which is fairly clear and communicable. The hermeneutic task of the analyst is to drive each symbol back to its origin in the archetype and thereby to manifest its meaning. Jaspers argues that a genuine symbol cannot have a circumscribed referent and that it serves to cancel itself in the face of a transcendence which has no contour or structure.

Jung's archetypes function like Peirce's dynamical objects as hidden yet always operative constraints to meaning. The archetype is not, strictly speaking, a thing-in-itself because it can manifest its nature through the phenomena of psychic life. It serves as a psychic magnet guiding and validating the hermeneutic process toward convergence with the truth. This tie of the symbol to a specific referent forces Jung to objectify that which must more properly be seen as indefinite in meaning. This makes for a dangerous superstition. Jaspers states:

Where historical and psychological knowledge is treated as if it could provide effective symbols for suffering people, superstition may be the result, a credulous belief which attempts in a limited fashion to fixate symbols that are themselves indefinite, constantly in motion and not to be grasped objectively. Deeply rooted traditions are turned inside out in the process and misused for therapeutic purposes (they become a sort of measuring-rod for happiness and health).

Where this is so, the symbols are symbols no longer.⁸

In Jaspers' terminology, Jung fails to see how genuine symbols become ciphers of transcendence. In so far as a symbol is no longer a mere sign with a specific, if elusive, referent, it becomes open to that reality which is without a center or circumference. The true meaning of those symbols which live within our psychic life is their immediate correlation to that which locates and governs the self.

Here we see the tension between two fundamentally different hermeneutic perspectives. Both Jaspers and Jung would firmly reject the post-modernist hermeneutics of suspicion even if their categorial frameworks move in quite divergent directions. Jaspers' perspective might best be called a hermeneutics of transcendence in which each symbol derives its articulation and meaning from its rootedness in that encompassing reality which does not admit of specific semiotic content. Jung's perspective might best be called a hermeneutics of origin in which each symbol is located within the intelligibility structures of the collective unconscious. If the hermeneutics of suspicion undermines all attempts at validation and propels the self away from an internal meaning center, the hermeneutics of transcendence relocates the center of meaning within the axis which lies between *Existenz* and transcendence. While the encompassing itself does not have a center or circumfer-

ence, it does provide such a center for the human self. Within the heart of existential shipwreck lies the power of transcendence which both inaugurates and saves the foundering of the self. The hermeneutics of origin, while sensitive to polyvalent meaning structures, insists upon a more uniform process of translation whereby the given symbol is derived from its originating archetype. Jaspers accuses Jung of forcing a hermeneutic straitjacket on the potential infinity of symbol meaning. Jaspers states:

Interpretation brings with it a basic feeling of 'getting behind the scenes'. One uncovers, exposes and displays, as it were, the art of cross-examination, a police-technique. Almost the whole of psycho-analytic understanding is dominated by this fundamental, negative attitude of unmasking.⁹

Yet, unlike the hermeneutics of suspicion which would deny that anything given is exposed in the interpretive process, the hermeneutics of origin finds that residuum which validates the analyst's probings into the psyche.

Jung, of course, would reject Jaspers' open-ended hermeneutics as itself arbitrary and merely aesthetic in its "hovering" over possibilities. The hermeneutics of transcendence fails to find and articulate any stabilities or structures outside of the field of consciousness-as-such. Consequently, it fails to grasp both the phylogenetic nature of the self and its remarkable cultural uniformity through time and place. What Jaspers would call pseudo-illumination is in fact the only genuine illumination available to the existing individual. For Jung the central archetype of the Self, as embodied in such symbols as the divine child, the mandala, the wise old man, and the perennial forces of nature, serves as the hermeneutic touchstone for all intrapsychic interpretations. The hermeneutics of origin locates meaning squarely within the a priori structures of the collective unconscious.

While Jaspers does not flatly reject the notion that symbols may have content outside of their relation to transcendence, he does argue that we must become free from a bondage to these symbols. The chief danger of depth psychology, and its attendant hermeneutics of origin, is its tendency to let the archetypes constrain and eclipse the power of our radical *Existenz*. Jaspers states:

Over against this whole world of symbols we have within ourselves a primary resource whereby this whole world is made relative. We are liberated from our bondage to symbols of self-reflection. This protects us from credulity, which is a constant threat to us, and carries us through and beyond all symbols, making it possible for us to form a new and deeper bond, that of *Existenz* now linked with an imageless transcendence that speaks to us is the absolute of goodness and in the miracle of receiving oneself as a gift in the spontaneity of freedom.¹⁰

Jaspers extends the notion of foundering into the heart of his theory of symbol function and formation. In so far as a symbol itself founders on the rock of transcendence it propels self-reflection beyond its normal boundaries. The shipwreck of symbols takes place through a process of *via negativa* in which all meaning claims are overturned so that the light of transcendence may appear through the interstices of our semiotic structures. Ironically, Jaspers seems to posit

a Kantian formalism which denies meaningful semiotic and referential content. The hermeneutics of transcendence runs the risk of destabilizing the self in much the same way as the hermeneutics of suspicion. To see if this is a serious problem we will examine how the hermeneutics of origin has been modified in the work of James Hillman.

Jung placed priority on the archetype of the Self as the ultimate foundation of both the psyche and those hermeneutic acts which struggle to illuminate the given topology of the individual. All other archetypes, such as the anima and animus, are subaltern to that fundamental structure which locates and governs them. Hence, Jung's hermeneutics of origin was able to secure its validation through a 'reductive' analysis which moved from surface phenomena to the animating depth core in the collective unconscious. Andrew Samuels, a historian of the Jungian movement, argues that Hillman, in most respects a champion of the general Jungian perspective, makes a decisive move away from the priority of the Self archetype:

We have seen how a restrictive view of the psyche, deriving partly from Jung's 'theological' temperament, placed the self in a pre-eminent position compared, for example, to animus/anima, and this stimulated Hillman to dispute the primacy of the self, quaternity, mandalas, etc. Hillman accents a psychological parity of the self and other so-called archetypes of psyche.¹¹

In arguing for a kind of ontological parity, Hillman decentralizes the Self archetype and puts pressure on any hermeneutics of origin which would posit a priority scheme for the psyche as a whole. At the same time, however, Hillman reaffirms the general tenor of depth psychology and insists that analysis is primarily concerned with a detailed exploration of the images of the soul. Any given archetype can serve as the gateway to the inner transformation of the person and can serve to govern and locate the other archetypes.

The concern of analysis is not with deriving each manifestation of the soul from some prior and stable structure which would serve as the point of origin for the given manifestations but with an indefinite exploration of the images themselves. Hillman envisions a form of analysis which leaves behind questions of origin for an emphasis on the opus of transformation. This creative exfoliation of images and impressions does not have a pre-determined trajectory, say one moving directly from the shadow, to the anima, to the Self, but develops its own internal logic as it proceeds. Underlying and animating the phantasy process is the fundamental creative drive which is largely free from psychopathology. Creativity is, for Hillman, as much an instinct as hunger and sexuality. The opus of transformation is quickened by the creative drive which lies at the heart of the soul and, by analogy, within the bosom of nature.

Like Jaspers, Hillman emphasizes that psychic transformation entails its own forms of destruction or shipwreck. Hillman insists that evil is an intrinsic trait in the realm of the soul. He states:

Since psychological creativity will occupy the same destructive/constructive poles that describe the instinct in general, we are left with the realization that soul-making entails soul-destroying. An analysis

for the sake of the soul-making cannot help but be a venture into destructiveness.¹²

In the constant interplay of innumerable images, the soul undergoes a threat to its internal integrity as that integrity relates to the general contour of the self's relations to the social orders. The symbolic wealth of the soul easily admits of those demonic distortions which fragment and destroy the movement toward wholeness. In this opus of transformation, nothing is guaranteed as to goal or ultimate outcome. In Hillman's overturning of the role of the origin, the soul is left without those stable phylogenetic supports which function to undergird Jung's model of the self.

Hillman's notion of the "soul" serves as a rough analogue to Jaspers' notion of *Existenz*. In both cases, these realities serve as the animating depth structure of intra- and inter- psychic transaction. The opus of transformation has some parallels with the illumination of *Existenz*. In either case, clarity is sought as to the creative and originating impulses of the non-foundation structures of the person. Yet Hillman wishes to have a depth dimension for the self without falling prey to the kind of mythological reductionism that he sees in Jung. Such a reductionism, as we noted earlier, drives all interpretation back to a finite number of clearly demarcated archetypes which serve as the measure for hermeneutic validation. Samuels presents the difference as follows:

. . . Hillman observes that he looks at myths to open things and not to ground the issue. The suggestion is that such grounding is what happens in the Classical School. The charge of the mythological reductionism on his part is thus refuted by Hillman. For him, myth leads to ever more productive circumambulation and experience of the image.¹³

The deconstruction of origin, and its attendant search for grounds and first principles, makes it possible to concentrate more fully on the sheer proliferation of images which inundate the soul as it struggles against its own tendencies toward self-destruction. Hillman, even more than Jung, champions an aestheticising attitude toward those archetypal fragments that hover around the soul in its trajectory through time.

The emphasis shifts from the hermeneutics of origin toward what could be called an erotic hermeneutics. Eros is, for Hillman, one of the major motor forces behind the soul's ontogenetic evolution. Unlike agape, eros struggles to encompass the more valuable through an outward movement of generic inclusion. The soul desires that *Summum Bonum* which lies just beyond its reach. Hillman states:

Similarly, the effect of eros on psyche is characterized by what we have already described as an awakening and engendering. And this too has a prerequisite: bringing eros to all psychic contents whatsoever—symptoms, moods, images, habits—and finding them fundamentally lovable and desirable.¹⁴

Images, no matter how disparate in form and expression, become unified with the soul's work of transformation through the blindingness of eros. The erotic trans-

formation of mythical material moves away from the drive for specific origins toward a unity which derives from the overall evolving contour of the imagistic material. While this contour has highly shifting boundaries, it remains as a stabilizing force in the life of the soul.

Earlier we stated that Hillman's archetype psychology, perhaps better named an eros psychology, runs the risk of anarchy in its rejection of the power of origin. In our concluding remarks, we will attempt to delineate the limitations of both an erotic hermeneutics and the hermeneutics of origin. The argument will turn on how we can redefine the nature of the erotic and the originating without denying their importance. This entails showing how the hermeneutics of transcendence stands as the encompassing perspective within which hermeneutic frameworks of lesser scope are located.

For Jaspers, the drive toward transcendence does not deny the necessity for some sense of origin. Rather, the nature of the origin becomes transformed under the impress of the encompassing which lures us beyond those constricted shells of personal and social existence. Thought moves toward the encompassing by recognizing the finitude of all horizons. In *Von der Wahrheit*, published in 1947, Jaspers states:

The encompassing can be sensed because there is a horizon, i.e., something always shows itself beyond each horizon which encloses each attained horizon without itself being horizon. The encompassing is then never the horizon within which our knowledge is located and in which we encounter any definite mode of Being, for the encompassing is never visible as a horizon.¹⁵

The encompassing is more than the 'sum' of all horizons and serves to both shatter them and to sustain them in a new way once they have suffered shipwreck. Yet it is important to note that thought about the encompassing returns us to origin. In this return, of course, origins have to be understood as deriving their meaning and power from that encompassing measure which is not an origin. Later in *Von der Wahrheit* Jaspers, describing thought about the encompassing, states:

It is a thought which turns us around, releasing us from all specific beings, and forcing us to re-turn from every solidified position.

The thought itself does not show us a new object. Seen in the light of usual knowledge of the world, it is empty. However, by means of its form it opens up the simply universal possibility of Being.

The thought awakens us so that we learn to listen to that which authentically is. It enables us to perceive origins.¹⁶

The freedom from too close a dependence on specific beings or on regional a priori structures of intelligibility does not generate a freedom from all origins. The power of transcendence quickens and deepens all origins without becoming slavishly attached to the power that speaks from out of the origin, whether the origin be archetypal or not. The hermeneutics of transcendence does not negate the hermeneutics of origin but gives it a horizon of greater scope within which to operate.

While the hermeneutics of suspicion would reject the very presence of an origin as a return to that kind of privileged metaphysical thinking which effaced the genuine differences between and among natural complexes, the hermeneutics of transcendence recognizes that the human process, dependent as it is on prior natural processes requires originating powers and structures if it is to avoid pathological shipwreck. In the deconstruction of all origins the self is unable to find any meaning or inner trajectory for its semiotic wealth. What is most interesting is that the total eclipse of origins entails the eclipse of transcendence as well. Origins, which are not necessarily foundational in a rigid sense, provide the 'matter' which quickens and deepens the movement of transcending. The fitful and radically open drive toward transcendence is itself dependent upon those originating powers which give it the 'place' from which to move.

Symbols point in two directions. On the one hand they speak of the phylogenetic structures which gave them birth while on the other hand they move toward that self-shattering which allows for the light of transcendence. Jaspers' reading of the cipher script is one sided in so far as it over-emphasizes the shipwreck of symbols. Jung's hermeneutics of origin is one-sided in so far as it fails to penetrate into the deeper logic of the entire symbolic process.

Shifting our terminology slightly, we can say that the analysis and manipulation of symbols is without direction or forms of validation until this opus becomes part of the illumination of the *Existenz*/transcendence axis. The hermeneutics of suspicion, which Jaspers brilliantly critiques in his studies of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, attempts to free itself from any lingering sense of origin. But in the process it shatters any genuine transcendence which would link the human self to something of greater scope and power. The annihilation of origin is, by a logic as relentless as it is tragic, the annihilation of the contours of personality. The death of origin is birth of the truly pathological. For the very distinction between pathology and health is only possible within the realm of true origins and goals.

Jung's delineation of the archetypes of the collective unconscious remains one of the most evocative and valid analyses of the truth of origin. However, as Hillman's post-Jungian reflections show, such a drive toward origins, when bereft of the deeper sense of transcendence, runs the risk of an aestheticising tendency which remains content to enter the erotic free play of images and myths. Hillman's erotic hermeneutics, more concerned with expansion and indefinite manipulation of symbolic meanings than with a topological analysis of the phylogenetic structures of intelligibility, looses both origin and transcendence. His defense of the centrality of the soul, as the locus of the work of transformation, does not protect him from the anarchy of sheer symbolic plenitude.

Erotic hermeneutics carries with it the tactical advantage that it is open to the sheer plenitude of sign and symbol possibilities. It warns us against attempting to circumscribe the hermenetic process by delimiting the number and scope of archetypes from the outset. The opus of transformation is an ongoing process which cannot set a limit to the number of archetypal possibilities available to the self in transition. However, eros is in danger of foundering on two sides. From the standpoint of the multiple archetypal origins it runs the risk of deifying the human

soul rather than those 'eternal' structures which give the soul its very meaning and direction. From the perspective of the encompassing, eros remains bereft of that apapistic love which does not move from the less to the more perfect but receives the self even in its most severe shipwreck.

The hermeneutics of origin, when grounded in the hermeneutics of transcendence, receives that deeper measure which preserves its insights while locating them in the drive for the encompassing. More pervasive than eros, and more illuminating than suspicion, is the light of transcendence which frees each origin from self-idolatry. This freedom is the gift of the encompassing to us. As we receive this gift, we learn the secret of that which sustains all origins from a region beyond all of our horizons.

FOOTNOTES

1. The hermeneutics of suspicion has been most fully developed by the followers of Jacques Derrida who insist that all of reality can be understood in terms of the metaphor of the text. Not only is every natural complex a text, but such texts are capable of an infinite number of interpretations. There are no textual or extra-textual constraints to the evolving contour of interpretations. In addition, any given interpretation is subject to a deconstructive reading which will attempt to unmask its hidden ideological and metaphysical presuppositions. In a striking sense, all interpretations are suspect. The concept of origin is rigorously critiqued.
2. Karl Jaspers, *General Psychopathology*, trans. by J. Hoenig and Marian W. Hamilton, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), p. 287. In some cases I have modified the Hoenig-Hamilton translation in order to bring it into harmony with current translation practices.
3. Carl G. Jung, *The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche*, second edition, (Princeton: Billigen Series XX, Princeton University Press, 1972), p. 158.
4. Karl Jaspers, *General Psychopathology*, p. 330.
5. As taken from, *Karl Jaspers: Basic Philosophical Writings*, ed. and trans. by Edith Ehrlich, Leonard H. Ehrlich, & George B. Pepper, (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1986), p. 99.
6. Karl Jaspers, *General Psychopathology*, p. 309.
7. Karl Jaspers, *General Psychopathology*, p. 331.
8. Karl Jaspers, *General Psychopathology*, p. 339.
9. Karl Jaspers, *General Psychopathology*, p. 361.
10. Karl Jaspers, *General Psychopathology*, p. 340.
11. Andrew Samuels, *Jung and the Post-Jungians*, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985), p. 243.
12. James Hillman, *The Myth of Analysis: Three Essays in Archetypal Psychology*, (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), p. 37.
13. Andrew Samuels, *Jung and the Post-Jungians*, p. 242.
14. James Hillman, *The Myth of Analysis*, p. 98.
15. Karl Jaspers, *Karl Jaspers: Basic Philosophical Writings*, pp. 26-27.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 28.

Antivivisection: Questions of Logic, Consistency, and Conceptualization

Gordon G. Gallup, Jr.
State University of New York at Albany

and

Susan D. Suarez
State University of New York, College at Oneonta

Animal research versus animal welfare: The hypocrisy of antivivisection

Questions of animal welfare and animal rights have captured a growing amount of public and political attention. Antivivisectionists have become increasingly critical of all animal research and behavioral research has been targeted as an issue of particular concern (e.g., Friends of Animals, 1984). Indeed, McArdle (1984), who until recently was a ranking official of the Humane Society of the United States, advocates the "complete elimination" of all psychological experimentation on animals (p. 3).

Are animal welfare and animal rights activists conscientiously concerned with the genuine well being of animals? Are they focusing their efforts where they can do the most good? Have they developed an internally consistent and logical stand on these issues? Are they innocent of selective perception and compartmentalization when it comes to questions of pain and suffering in animals? In this paper we critically examine some of the arguments against the use of animals in psychological research and show that many of the positions held by antivivisectionists are untenable.

Categories of Animal Use: Is Research a Special Case?

Our use of animals for *research* needs to be considered in the context of our use of animals for other purposes. When it comes to *food*, not only do many people eat meat but we are reliant on animals for dairy products and eggs as well. The use of animals for *sport* involves such diverse activities as hunting, fishing, horse racing, and frog jumping contests. As we once were, people in many third world countries are highly dependent upon animals (e.g., oxen, dogs, horses, elephants) as a source of *labor*. There are probably as many animals kept as *pets* by people in this country as there are people. It is estimated that American taxpayers foot the bill to the tune of \$500 million each year just to clean up after dogs and cope with all the disease, damage, and injuries they cause (see Fox, 1986). Animals are a common source of material for the fabrication of *clothes*, in the form of leather, wool, down, and fur. Animals are used by people for *defense* (e.g., guard dogs) and as a form of *amusement* (circuses, zoos, pony rides, etc.). Seeing eye dogs and the recent efforts to train capuchin monkeys to serve as aides for quadriplegics (Willard, Dana, Stark, Owen, Zazula & Corcoran, 1982) illustrate our use of