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NATURALISM, MEASURE, AND THE ONTOLOGICAL DIFFERENCE

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Persons are embedded in innumerable natural complexes, many of which are neither of their own making nor within the control of their various methodologies. Opacity and reticence surround persons as the most telling marks of finitude. To be human is to be in debt to a nature which has no knowable coutour and no intelligible *telos*. We are embedded and incomplete even though cumulative and directional in our drive toward intelligibility and wholeness.

Our relation to nature, the context of our embeddedness, is more than mere adjustment as envisioned by Dewey and involves making, doing, and saying as forms of ramified judgment.[1] We both assimilate and manipulate complexes in order to render them more secure for further human probing. In the function of exhibitive judgments we fashion complexes in such a way as to manifest their trait contours. In the process we show the intrinsic meaning and power of the traits as ends-in-themselves. This form of judgment is best seen in the domain of aesthetic query where traits stand-forth as an abidingness pure and simple. In the function of assertive judgements we create truth-functional linguistic artifacts whch stabilize our ability to convert random impressions into the functional genera of systematic or scientific apprehension. These genera are regional and function as pragmatic a prioris. They constitute the thematic clearings of our natural embeddedness. Assertive judgments can be said to exist whenever language is used to affirm or deny traits or processes in the domain of nature. Finally, active judgments prevail whenever we transform natural or communal structures in order to bring about a new ordering of traits. Unlike exhibitive judgment, active judgment is not concerned with traits as ends-in-themselves but as they function to alter or reinforce other traits. We act through the compulsion of habit (a fairly regular and stable form of active judgment) in order to test and probe our physical and mental environments so as to secure meaningful and predictable patterns for moral and communicative life. Active judgments are best understood as products of human action whether random or methodic.

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In our assimilation and manipulation of the innumerable complexes of nature we do more than solve problems of transaction or interaction. We feel the burden of traits which show their prevailing power across time and place. We participate in the effervescent and quixotic events which stand before us as constant reminders of the ironic depths of nature. We probe traits and we allow traits to probe us in our constant effort to find meaningful contours for the direction of our fitful movements toward unity. In each case we stand under a natural compulsion which defines and governs our intricate dealings with the complexes of nature.

In articulating the scope and structure of human embeddedness we must avoid the facile assurances of a naive empiricism which would assure us that it is experience which is experienced and not nature. Further, we must reject the notion that knowledge claims constitute our main route of access to the complexes of the world. Rather, following Dewey, we must affirm that experience is both in and of nature. Dewey states:

> It is not experience which is experienced, but nature—stones, plants, animals, diseases, health, temperature, electricity, and so on. Things interacting in certain ways *are* experience; they are what is experienced. Linked in certain other ways with another natural object—the human organism—they are *how* things are experienced as well. Experience thus reaches down into nature; it has depth. It also has breadth and to an indefinitely elastic extent. It stretches. That stretch constitutes inference.[2]

This and similar statements have often convinced philosophers that American naturalism, of which Dewey is a chief exemplar, is naive in its own way when it stresses our relation to a nature which somehow manifests itself in spite of the hermeneutic problem of finding valid interpretations from out of the wealth of possible signs and significations. In the attempt to arrive at a just and forceful account of experience, naturalism has had to fight a number of crucial battles against previous philosophies which sought to limit both poles to a narrow and artificial confine. Let us review these briefly.

In the movement away from Kant and Hegel, thinkers like Peirce and Dewey had to show that experience was permeated by a fundamental resistance or secondness which could only come from that domain within which experience was located. This resistance was not understood as that which functioned to constitute nature as a secondary result of intentional acts but as that which came out of a prior domain of real objects and classes. In the movement away from Locke and Hume, naturalism had to show that the atomistic and passive understanding of contiguous and externally related sense-data was unable to show both the lived reality of relation and the temporal and social stretch of inference. At the same time, the naturalists had to integrate the categorial structures of evolutionary biology which made all previous accounts of the organism/environment transaction inadequate.

Further, in speaking of nature as a fundamental reality, naturalism had to emancipate itself from the honorific and eulogistic tradition as exemplified in thinkers such as Emerson and Royce. Nature could not be envisioned as the exalted domain of spirit or as the home of the divine agency but as the realm or realms of transaction and evolutionary ramification. Finally, contemporary naturalists such as Justus Buchler have had to show that semiotics and hermeneutics derive their operational parameters not from the free-play of non-referential signs (as in Deconstruction) but from the felt contours of complexes which prevail forcefully in their own right. The naturalist account of experience and nature does not insist on a naive realism in the tradition of G. E. Moore, but demands that experience be grasped as it emerges from within the multi-form transactions which cannot be prescinded by the puritanical claims of empiricism.

Naturalism thus insists on carefully tracing out the contours of natural traits in such a way as to give full justice to both sides of the experience/ nature divide. At no point is it assumed that we can arrive at a hermeneutically neutral or semiotically self-grounded understanding of world. Rather, our signs and interpretations emerge out of a context which has its own compulsion and its own felt lines of convergence. In a critique of Cassirer's idealistic theory of symbolic forms, Buchler shows the one-sidedness of any philosophic perspective which places too much emphasis on the autonomy of mental and spiritual productions. He states:

> Language is a "way of seeing" the world, a way of rendering it into symbolic cloth. The symbolic forms of language, myth, science, and art are regarded partly as modes of individual perspective and partly as cultural frameworks. Great as are the values of this approach, it inclines to mentalize perspective. Moreover, it looks upon nature too much as fitting various symbolic schemes, and too little as determining symbols and compelling products.[3]

This can be restated by saying that semiotics and hermeneutics place too much emphasis on the manipulative rather than the assimilative dimension of experience. As Peirce, Royce, Mead, and others have shown, communication and sign-translation are guided by natural and communal structures which have laid down prior traces of a highly compulsive quality.

The obvious question becomes: do these traces function as arbitrary and imperial products or do they function as genuine clearings which open out into the immense richness and complexity of world and community? The answer to this question can only come as a result of ramified and relentless social query. For Peirce and Dewey, the methods of science serve to save interpretation from distortion and artificial forms of domination. A more mature and radicalized naturalism seeks for semiotic validation in a variety of methods and cumulative probings of the complexes of nature. Yet method, no matter

how complex or robust, cannot deliver us from false traces without a prior recognition of the intrinsic resistance and pressure of complexes not of our own making. Our embeddedness is rife with structures and lines of convergence which testify to their gradual emergency across both time and place. Naturalism, as here understood, honors these resistant traces in such a way as to secure them for conscious apprehension and critical assessment.

Our natural embeddedness, our fundamental thrownness, becomes clearer when we examine the modes of world that form the horizons for our finitude. We are embedded in institutions which determine and define our social interactions and sustain or cancel our aspirations. Language surrounds us as the mobile yet relatively stable sphere of meanings-in-use which makes world transparent to human apprehension. Our communicative parallelism with other selves leaves resistant traces which haunt and lure us toward hoped for consummations. Finally, our immersion in the bindingness of history and nature forms a compulsive matrix which we can neither elude nor overcome. It is only from within these horizons that we transform the shapes of embeddedness.

These now-delineated modes of world point toward a deeper insight into the structure of nature. Human experience finds itself related not to a world-in-itself or a nature-pure-and-simple, but to orders and regions which cannot be enumerated or laid bare by systematic query. Experience points ineluctably to the fact that our world is constituted by orders of unlimited complexity and possible exemplification. Nature is ordinal and this ordinality requires novel and complex categorial delineations if the full scope of this reality is to be brought home to systematic thought. In the radicalization of naturalism the concept of ordinality becomes central to the new understanding of nature.

As should have emerged from the previous statements, the notion of the "natural complex" functions as a basic, perhaps *the* basic, concept in the ordinal version of naturalism.[4] This notion entails that neither nature nor experience can find or discriminate anything which could be called simple in all respects. This insight is further reinforced if relational predicates or relational structures are seen to be part of any given complex. Hence we can affirm that whatever is, is complex. Complexes are *natural* in the sense that no complex can prevail if it is unrelated to any other complex. No complex will relate to all other complexes but it must relate to some. Any doctrine of internal relations, for example that found in Whitehead's notion of the prehensive spread of the actual occasion, is ruled out in principle. Any given natural complex will be located in some orders but not all. Further, it will locate orders within itself. These subaltern orders will collectively form the integrity of the complex.

Complexes are located and locate other orders within themselves. This notion of dual location makes it impossible ever to affirm that

nature or world prevails as a static order of orders or place of places. There is no location which could stand as the final contour of reality. A given complex thus stands in various relations to other complexes but these relations can never be fully drawn or made intelligible. The forms and types of relation are inexhaustible even though no complex will relate to all other complexes. As we shall see, this radically recasts our notion of nature.

We must be willing to deepen our understanding of relationality in world and nature if we are to feel the power of ordinal naturalism. In the foundational text of ordinal metaphysics, *Metaphysics of Natural Complexes*, Buchler sketches this broader conception of relation and ordinality:

> All natural complexes are relational, though not only relational. Any complex is related to others, though not to all others; and its traits are related to one another, though not necessarily each to every other. Whatever is, is in some relation: a given complex may be unrelated to another given complex, but not unrelated to any other. A complex related to another complex in one respect may not be related to it in another respect. There is no end to the relational "chain" of a complex; and there is no end to the explorability of a complex, whether in respect of its relational traits or any other.[5]

Needless to say, this view insists that relations are as real or as functional as the relata. On one side, metaphysical atomism is firmly rejected in its insistence that non-relational and simple realities can exist. On the other side, the doctrine of strict internal relations is rejected with its insistence that every given reality is strongly or weakly relevant to every other reality. The conceptual inadequacies of atomism and internal relation are most forcefully manifest whenever either position attempts to delineate the general traits of world and nature. Atomism fails to explain the persistence of historical and habitual structures in both physical and psychic domains. The doctrine of internal relations fails utterly to account for difference and discontinity. When atomism and internal relation are conjoined in thinkers such as Leibniz and Whitehead, the defense of persistent traits invariable falls back on some notion of a divine principle of harmony or prehensive relevance. This in itself should warn us of the categorial excesses of pre-ordinal conceptions of nature.

Nature, as innumerable natural complexes, is neither totally discontinuous nor fully self-referential. Ordinal naturalism rules out anything like Royce's actual infinite as a fully self-conscious series. Mind is not a trait constitutive of all natural complexes. Absolute Idealism, whether or not it entails panpsychism, fails to illuminate the resistent shocks which partially constitute genuine diremption. Relation, mental or otherwise, is ordinal or not at all.

The principle of ordinality is succinctly stated in Beth Singer's work, *Ordinal Naturalism: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Justus Buchler:*

> It defines nature to be an infinitely dense, indefinitely extended and ramified multiplicity of orders, intersecting in limitless ways. The principle entails that every discriminable

complex is a network of related components and is embedded in an indefinitely ramified network of relations. There are no discrete or independent or atomic entitites. The principle of ordinality, the statement that every complex is an order of complexes and belongs to an indefinite number of orders, is the fullest expression of what it means to say that whatever is, is a natural complex, and the concept of natural complex is not fully intelligible apart from it.[6]

To summarize the ground attained thus far: natural complexes, Buchler's name for whatever is in whatever way, are themselves orders of traits. Each complex locates its own traits 'within' itself. Yet a given complex will also be located by other complexes. No complex can fail to both locate its own traits and be located by other traits and complexes. Yet no circle of circles or nature of natures prevails which will provide the final order within which all others occur. This can be restated by saying that nature has no contour either in itself or from the perspective of finite human query.

If nature has no contour or ultimate shape, then we must rethink the standard geometric and other metaphors which function at the foundations of metaphysics. Nature cannot be translated into such metaphors as: the ultimate concentric circle, the container of all 'stuff', the perspective of perspectives (as in Absolute Idealism), the series of series (as in Bradley and Royce), the undifferentiated substance with its finite appearances (as in Spinoza), or the monistic will-to-power as enhancement and preservation (as in Nietzsche). Such metaphoric enhancements of systemic query fail to exhibit the ordinal reality of natural complexes and their endless ramifications and relations. In our systematic attempt to sustain some communicable analogies and metaphors of nature per se (if even this formulation may remain) we find that our images are sadly lacking in their imaginative scope to crystallize a vision of ordinality. Yet the very shattering of metaphor is itself illuminating in that it shows the painful limitations of pre-ordinal delineations of nature and world.

We must beware of the obvious temptation to envision ordinality as somehow detachable from that which is ordered. We cannot equate ordinality with mere order or structure, although these too will have ordinal locations. In a remarkable intuition into this intimate relation between orders and that which is the bearer of traits, Dewey evokes a preliminary understanding of ordinality:

The fact is that all structure is structure *of* something; anything defined as structure is a character of *events*, not something intrinsic and per se. A set of traits is called structure, because of its limiting function in relation to other traits of events. A house has a structure; in comparison with the disintegration and collapse that would occur without its presence, this structure is fixed. Yet it is not something external to which the changes involved in building and using the house have to submit. It is rather an arrangment of changing events such that properties which change slowly, limit and direct a series of quick changes and give them an order which they do not otherwise possess.[7]

Dewey's metaphysical insight reminds us that geometric metaphors of independent structures or orders fail to show that structure is always embedded in and reactant to complexes which are structured. To attempt to detach structure from its given complex is to fall prey to the wrong kind of generic abstraction from the concrete case. What we are tempted to call independent structures are in fact repeated events of great temporal scope.

Of course, structure and order are not exhaustive of the concept or principle of ordinality. There are orders which are disorderly and which have an unstable trait constitution. Some complexes are augmented, some coalesce with others, some are vagrant or novel, and some experience a type of ontological spoliation.[8] Not all natural complexes are orderly although all are orders.

We should also avoid the temptation to assume that an intuitive picture of space/time, whether absolute or regional, is sufficiently generic to encompass all complexes no matter what their constitution. Certainly many natural complexes can be seen to be governed by regional topologies and place-specific temporality. Yet it would be a mistake to extend the categorial structures of even regional space/time to nature or world. Some complexes are spatial and some are not. Some complexes are temporal and some are not. Further, spatiality and temporality are themselves constituted in a variety of ways. Space locates and is located. Time locates and is located. These forms of dual location can vary from one ordinal location to another. The common sense understanding of topology and temporality can carry little categorial freight in an ordinal understanding of reality. By the same token, the view of process philosophers that whatever is, is in process, assumes that the categorial structure of lived epochal time is itself sufficiently generic to encompass all complexes. Allied to this confusion is the implicit panpsychism of process philosophers from Leibniz to Hartshorne, which ascribes mental traits to even the most primitive of complexes. One of the achievements of the principle of ordinality is to show that the categorial delineations appropriate for one order may not be appropriate for another. Traits are ordinal or regional and must not be allowed to usurp their ordinal location in some misplaced drive toward generic inclusiveness.

Frequently, vague discourse about regions or pluralistic structures, collapses into the view that the discrimination between and among orders is a function of subjective and arbitrary human decisions. The sciences are often seen as carving up ontic regions of inquiry according to prior conceptual structures which may or may not have a correlation to the traits and orders outside of human subjectivity. On this view, to say that the world is plural is to say that human subjects constitute and project regional a prioris which serve to parcel out the vast unknown of nature and world. Thinkers as diverse as Goodman and Derrida assure us that we must go beyond the reference function and live in the

mediated realm of texts and concepts. Nature is held to be little more than the imperial origin which both haunts and invalidates all thinking.

This issue here hinges on the notion of definition. If definition is linguistic alone, then the burden of categories must lie not on nature but on the conventions of human utterance. Once this view is accepted, and many contemporary thinkers have done so, the road to pluralism is opened. The principle of ordinality does not entail that of pluralism because pluralism fails to account for extra-linguistic structures and for real relationality and continuity. To advance beyond linguistic pluralism, and there is no other kind, we must recast our understanding of definition to include what Buchler calls "natural definition." Buchler introduces the notion of natural definition in order to overcome some traditional problems connected with theories of possibility and possible worlds.

> Understood as a human product, definition has been thought to fall mainly within the area of assertive judgment; to consist of resolutions or procedures or conventions or stipulations or stated hypotheses or bodies of statements designed to abet the validation of propositions. Little room has been left for the conception of definition as effected humanly in the process of contriving or of acting and doing....Natural definition is the definition of natural complexes that is accepted in practice when, for instance, it is recognized that an image is defined upon the retina, or when it is recognized that a course of events has defined the options available for action.[9]

Hence, the relation between complexes defines the actualities and possibilities which can be realized in a given situation. Possibilities are neither eternal nor purely logical but come and go as the relations change between and among complexes. Complexes define and delimit each other independently of the conventions of assertive judgment. This insight is often easier to obtain in common sense reflection upon experience than in the epistemologically attuned reflections of many philosophers.

Possibilities and actualities are ordinal and not independent of their given natural complexes. A pure possibility is no possibility at all. The principle of ordinality, as deepened by the notion of natural definition, insists that complexes delimit each other and are delimited in turn. Naturalism, as a philosophical position, insists that human query attune itself to the definition of traits which occurs whenever non-linguistic and non-human complexes relate, whether weakly or strongly.

Since neither nature nor world has a real or knowable final contour, it follows that complexes define and delimit each other in an endless variety of ways. We have seen that definitions can exist either in the domain of assertive judgments (with their truth-functional structure) or in the natural domain where complexes interact. This can be restated by saying that definitions which are stipulated assertively *measure out* categories and regions from the side of human utterance. Natural definitions emerge from the numerous relations that obtain between complexes 'outside' of human manipulation.

Complexes delimit and measure each other by determining their mutual scope and identity. This process has no immediate relation to assertive definition. This dual notion of definition, namely, assertive and natural, carries with it a dual notion of *measure*. From the side of human utterance it can be said that we provide or propose the measure by and through which nature is to be rendered intelligible. Nature, as innumerable natural complexes, can be said to provide its own measure. In the ordinal framework we can say that nature constitutes and ramifies innumerable measures which delimit and order complexes. The measuring is, of course, not linguistic, but functions to provide scope for possibility and actuality. We can say that this natural measuring is an *apportioning* rather than a *proportioning*. The apportioning measure of nature or world is portioned out by the innumerable natural complexes prevailing in a variety of contexts.

Human proportioning is the imposition of measure by finite query. The limits and measures of reality are stated, posited, stipulated, imposed, or framed by linguistic acts which exist independently of the apportioning measure of nature or world. To proportion is to en-frame complexes according to prior structures which have a conventional form of bindingness. This insight has been carefully stated by Heidegger in his reflections on the essence of truth. In the following passage he refers to our tendency to take and impose measure from ontic reality:

> From these man then takes his *standards*, forgetting Being as a whole. He persists in them and continually supplies himself with new *standards*, yet without considering either the ground for *taking up standards* (*Massnahme*) or the essential process of what *gives* the standard (*Massgabe*). In spite of his advance to new standards and goals, man overlooks the essential genuineness of his standards. He *measures* himself all the more ingenuinely the more exclusively he takes himself as the *measure* for all entities.[10]

Heidegger distinguishes between that measure which is proposed by persons on Being and that which comes from Being in its mittance. In order to advance in our understanding of the dual nature of measure we must show how the ordinal framework can appropriate this deepened understanding of proportioning and apportioning. This can be restated by saying that some form of Heidegger's *ontological difference* between Being and beings must be found applicable to ordinal metaphysics.

The difficulty lies in the fact that the ordinal framework does not consider the ontological difference to be a real difference. That is, complexes can either prevail or not prevail but it makes no sense to assume that Being stands as the origin or ground for that which does prevail. In the radicalization of the concept of ordinality we must take heed of the post-Heideggerian critiques of the concept of ground which is implied in Heidegger's understanding of the ontological difference. Our problem is thus to find some way of showing that we need not appeal to a foundation or ground of grounds in exhibiting the nature of measure. Apportioning must somehow be rendered intelligible without

reference to the concept of Being. Yet the distinction between *proportioning* and *apportioning* measure must remain tied to real difference in the constitution of place and location.

We can find our way closer to the heart of this problem by thinking through again the role of natural definition in providing measure for complexes. Complexes delimit each other and are delimited in turn. This measuring is *natural* in the sense that it is prior to human utterance and thematic and methodic query. Nature, which cannot function as a ground, apportions measure only in so far as innumerable complexes locate and are located ordinally. The place of a given complex is portioned out by other complexes and the given complex in turn obtains as its own counter measure. Yet this counter measure is not the proportioning of human inauthenticity but functions as the genuine counter-balance to the resistant presence of other complexes. Hence, each natural complex, no matter what its integrity or identity, stands under the portion meted out by other complexes.

We thus have one level of the ordinal reconstruction of the ontological difference, namely that between the given complex and the apportioning measure of its relevant order. This can be restated by saying that a given complex receives its measure from the larger order within which it is located. Both actualities and possibilities are apportioned by the larger order. This is not to say that every complex receives its portion without resistance. We can say that resistance functions to co-determine the scope and meaning of measure in any given ordinal location.

Thus far we have seen that persons can proportion measure by the radical imposition of mere conventional categories. Complexes other than persons, as understood from within the notion of natural definition, stand under the apportioning measure of other complexes. Of course, persons can themselves stand under the apportioning measure whenever they turn away from the hubris of en-framing. The first level of the ordinal notion of an ontological difference points out the diremption between that which is porportioned and or apportioned and the apportioning measure which stands behind both.

Yet it is not enough to speak of complexes and their larger ordinal measure. Behind this sense lies a deeper understanding of measure and being-measured. If we can understand the notion that any given complex will be measured by others of larger scope, then we can begin to think our way toward a measure which has unlimited scope. This measure, perhaps best described as a measureless measure, has been carefully probed and exhibited by the philosopher Karl Jaspers. In his concept of the *Encompasing* (*das Umgreifende*), Jaspers shows us how we can find a second dimension of the ontological difference which does not propose a ground or foundation but which does give us access to the notions of measure and place.

In his 1937 lectures, entitled *Philosophy of Existence*, Jaspers makes the important distinction between horizons, as understood phenomenologically, and that which is never a horizon.

> But the Encompassing is not the horizon of our knowledge at any particular moment. Rather, it is the source from which all new horizons emerge, without itself ever being visible as a horizon. The Encompassing always merely announces itself—in present objects and within the horizons—but it *never* becomes an *object*. Never appearing to us itself, it is that wherein everything else appears. It is also that due to which all things not merely are what they immediately seem to be, but remain transparent.[11]

Horizons, both phenomenal and categorial, receive their measure, their being-measured, from the Encompassing which is never a horizon. This higher measure is itself *without* a being-measured. Unlike the first level of the ontological difference where a complex is measured by other complexes, which are in turn measured by still others in an endless round-dance of apportioning, the Encompassing *resists* being measured. We can define the Encompassing as that which can never be encompassed.

For Jaspers, we find our way to the Encompassing by a process which is best described by the metaphor of shipwreck (*scheitern*). The experience of shipwreck occurs whenever our proportioning measure founders upon that which will not be brought under its sway. The hubris of proportioning is that it wants to *be* measure rather than to stand *under* measure. To be measured, which does not entail a form of passive collapse, is to allow for the apportioning measure both of other complexes and of the Encompassing. The sense of the Encompassing can best be understood as the gift of reason as it struggles to comprehend the multiple shipwrecks of its own proportioning.

Above, we pointed out the dangers involved for thought when geometric analogies or metaphors are allowed to delimit categorial ground. In the spirit of Wittgenstein, we must be wary of any one image which attempts to explain nature as a whole. However, we can find instances where a striking image can illuminate our situation. In his 1932 work, entitled *Philosophy*, Jaspers rejects the traditional notion of philosophical architechtonic by this striking metaphor:

> In another parable, the essential systematics in philosophizing would not be an edifice founded on cornerstones but a globe adrift in space—a globe which ceaselessly expands and contracts *ad infinitum*, will take asymmetric forms and lose them again, has no absolute center but different centers at different times, and must be upheld by a center that is no longer inside the globe but in the self-being that conceives it.[12]

From the ordinal perspective, Jaspers' metaphor of the nature of human philosophizing would not be inappropriate as a metaphor for nature. The globe adrift in space has no center of centers or place of places which could provide the principle of unity or wholeness. Instead, innumerable centers emerge to apportion measure to their respective orders. These apportioned orders do not have an over-arching order

which could unify the innumerable centers. Nature has no contour. This expanding and contracting globe, constituted by innumerable shifting centers, is itself apportioned by the 'space' which surrounds it. This empty space provides the Encompassing measure whch locates the globe, not in a delimited order of orders, but in the open clearing which can never be filled in by that which is encompassed.

The Encompassing can thus not be seen as the horizon of horizons which generates an abiding topology of all complexes and orders. Nor can the Encompassing be understood as a hidden ground or foundation which secures the architechtonic reach of nature and human query. The Encompassing has no 'internal' traits which could somehow be manifest in phenomena or their horizonal fields. Yet the Encompassing has one crucial *relational* trait. This trait is manifest as the *lure* which 'shows' complexes the measureless measure which portions out and governs all other measures.

The Encompassing lures complexes into an overcoming which is at the same time the finding of place. This place is the ramified ordinal network which governs a complex's life. Yet beyond this shifting network lies that which is the undelimited apportioning of measure. Every natural complex, no matter how brief its tenure or how great its scope, stands under the double apportioning of other complexes and the Encompassing. Place is portioned out and held in its apportioned measure. Place need not be static and need not function as mere contiguity. The lure of the Encompassing 'reminds' each complex (if such a psychological notion may be stretched) that it cannot itself be the measure either of itself or of the Encompassing.

In deepening our reflections on ordinality and measure we must face the recalcitrant problem of the Divine nature, or better, Divine natures. If we take seriously the claim that categorial delineations and insights apply to all dimensions of reality then we must probe into the possible contours of that natural complex whch is often held to be foremost or uppermost in ontological hierarchies. Our brief reflections on the Divine must not fall back on the notion of inexplicability. Such appeals to the unknowable, the hidden, the mysterious, the wholly other, and so on, betray theoretical fatigue rather than insight. If the ordinal framework is binding upon us at all then it must be able to shed light on that most difficult of complexes, the Divine.

We ask: in what way is the Divine related to the innumerable complexes of nature? Is the Divine to be equated with the Encompassing, as is frequently the case in the writings of Jaspers? Is the Divine both encompassed and encompassing as are other complexes? If so, how does the Divine stand in relation to measure and being-measured?

The Divine, in one of its natures or dimensions, stands as that which encompasses the innumerable complexes of nature. It limits and judges the self-aggrandizement of the finite. By so limiting the hubristic reach of that which is measured, it apportions measure as the power of

sustaining the prevalences constitutive of nature. The Divine can be seen as the power of wholeness which portions out place and location. Yet the innumerable complexes of nature are themselves resistant to the sustaining power of the encompassing Divine. This resistance, pervasive and eternal, limits the scope and power of the Divine.

The Divine in another of its natures or dimensions, is itself encompassed by that which it is not. The innumerable complexes of nature can not be equated with that which encompasses them. It follows that the Divine, even in its power of sustaining orders, has its own *other* in nature. While it is not correct to say that nature encompasses the Divine, it is correct to say that the Divine is encompassed in so far as something lies outside of itself. To push this reflection to its conclusion, we must say that the Divine is measured by the Encompassing itself. Jaspers' frequent equation of the Divine (Transcendence) and the Encompassing must be rejected. The Encompassing, as the lure which lies outside of all horizons and places, encompasses the Divine and provides it with its own being-measured. This is not to say that the Divine is finite but that it is not the highest apportioning measure. The Encompassing, as the undelimited clearing, measures *all* complexes including the Divine.

Finally, the Divine in yet another of its natures or dimensions, is itself located in the innumerable complexes of nature. This insight harks back to Whitehead's notion of the consequent nature of the Divine where he defines God's relativity and incompletion in terms of the physical prehensions of the processive universe. Without affirming a strictly processive understanding of nature, we can assert that the Divine is itself located, is itself measured by complexes other than itself. The Divine is measured by its appearances in art, in human apprehension, within texts, and in human communication. The Divine, never manifest without ordinal location, without transformation, is located continually by that which it is not.

Thus we can say that the Divine locates and is located. It locates the innumerable complexes of nature through its sustaining power. Yet it is in turn located both by the Encompassing itself and by the complexes of nature. No natural complex, even the Divine in its several natures, can prevail without being-measured. Is this to say that the Divine is limited, is perhaps in need of human help in its drive toward manifestation and measure? If so, then systematic query cannot be without value to the Divine life itself. For it is in our attempts to render complexes intelligible that they can manifest and in turn *find* that apportioned measure which both provides and sustains place.

NOTES

[1] The concept of judgment being adumbrated in this section has been developed by Justus Buchler in the following works: *Toward a General Theory of Human Judgment*,

2nd revised edition (New York: Dover Press, 1979); *Nature and Judgment* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955); and *The Main of Light* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974).

[2] John Dewey, *Experience and Nature* (New York: Dover Press, reprint of 1929 edition), pp. 4a-1.

[3] Justus Buchler, *Nature and Judgment*, p. 43.

[4] The notion of the natural complex is developed in Buchler's, *Metaphysics of Natural Complexes* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966).

[5] Justus Buchler, *Metaphysics of Natural Complexes*, p. 24.

[6] Beth J. Singer, *Ordinal Naturalism: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Justus Buchler* (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 1983), p. 160.

[7] John Dewey, *Experience and Nature*, p. 72.

[8] Buchler refers to the multiform changes of the traits of a complex as *alescence*. For a full articulation of this notion, cf., *Metaphysics of Natural Complexes*.

[9] Justus Buchler, *Metaphysics of Natural Complexes*, p. 165.

[10] Raymond Gogel, 'The Quest of Measure' (Unpublished dissertation, Drew University, Madison, N. J., 1982), pp. 231-32. This passage, translated by Gogel, comes from Heideggers's *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit*, p. 23. Dr. Gogel has been the first thinker to reflect on the problem of measure in Husserl and Heidegger. His distinction between "proportioning" and "apportioning" is worked out in detail in the above dissertation.

[11] Karl Jaspers, *Philosophy of Existence*, translated by Richard Grabau (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971), p. 18.

[12] Karl Jaspers, *Philosophy: Vol. I*, translated by E. B. Ashton (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), p. 284.