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   Peirce, Pragmatism, and the Logic of Scripture by Peter Ochs
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Peter Ochs has written a complex, forcefully conceived, and sometimes difficult book that wrestles with both the early and late thought of the man who is generally regarded as the foremost thinker of the so-called golden age of Euro-American philosophy. Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914), founder of pragmatism (later named by him pragmaticism), semiotics, and the logic of relatives, also developed a profound metaphysics and toward the end of his career probed into issues in philosophical theology. In the past decade we have seen a number of books on Peirce, most quite friendly to his overall perspective, and this scholarly trend will probably accelerate, although Peirce studies will never attain the kind of fervid intensity of Nietzsche studies. This is a shame because Peirce is at least as radical and transformative in his thinking as Nietzsche and deserves as much scholarly attention as his contemporary now enjoys. Ochs's book gives us some reasons as to why we need to capture some of that fervor for a thinker who can certainly be abstract in the extreme but who always wrestled with foundational issues in highly novel and evocative ways.

Since at least the 1950s (with the publication of Thomas Goudge's fine book on Peirce), it has been customary to speak of two Peirce's: the early and more scientific Peirce who built up his pragmatic epistemology and theory of method, and the later transcendentalyzing Peirce who created an airy metaphysics on La-markian lines that posited the force of evolutionary love in the universe over the infinite long run. The trend has been to dismiss Peirce's essays from the 1880s and '90s and to privilege his anti-Cartesian writings of the 1860s and '70s. Some have even argued that there is a general mental decline that is especially clear by the turn of the century and that Peirce had lost his rigor and his own grounding in a secure pragmatism that cleaved unto the sharp givenes of experience.

Ochs works very hard to reverse this usual portrait by lifting up the later pragmaticist writings to use them as a corrective of the early pragmatic material. But in doing so, several features of his own approach become manifest. The emphasis shifts away from Peirce as metaphysician and moves toward Peirce as cultural critic and healer, a kind of rabbinic critic of social norms as they can either heal or advance the needs of local communities. Local public practice becomes the matrix within which the pragmaticist works to make some sense of vagueness and of equivocal semiotic systems.

The radicalness of Ochs's model can be expressed this way. Usually Peirce's semiotics is understood in the context of a sign user who interprets a sign to another sign user. Thus, we have an original sign, a new sign, and a fellow interpreter. This is a basic semiotic triad that permeates experience on every level of sophistication. The model assumes that there is a sign and its corresponding object in common between at least two people and that there is an agreed upon method for reading and commenting on the sign/object correlation. That method is, of course, the pragmatic method, which involves the use of prediction and certain forms of inference, the most impressive being abduction which involves a leap of faith into a rule that is applied to a given case in the hope that
it will indeed be applicable. Thus, to update and modify one of Peirce’s own examples, suppose I see a woman step out of a large stretch limousine and notice that she is wearing what appears to be some kind of ritualized clothing that is clearly from another culture, and further that I notice that she is addressed with deference by the people around her. I can make an abduction that she has some official political role to play and that she is perhaps about to perform part of that role in the building she is now entering. Peirce would call my process of sign interpretation an abduction in which I posit a rule to explain a single case. The interpretive move is not deductive nor is it inductive, especially if there is some novelty to the sign system involved, thus putting it in a genus that is unfamiliar to me.

What Ochs wishes to add to this model is another layer of reflexivity that brings Peirce into the tradition of midrash and rabbinic commentary on common social and written texts, not just particular persons or objects. The focus shifts to writing and away from simpler models of one-on-one seeing and uttering. “Scriptural pragmatists characterize ‘writing,’ prototypically, as the activity of diagraming linguistic usage. While not essential to everyday practice, writing is in this sense essential to the activity of changing everyday practice; practical artisans—who are responsible for correcting everyday practice—are prototypically writers” (320-321).

The shift to a scriptural pragmatism (or pragmaticism) has traits in common with Lindbeck’s post-liberal reading of linguistic communities and their rules for self-identification. Ochs argues against the modernist project, as had the young Peirce, and affirms a form of post-liberalism in his reading of the later Peirce. Both Lindbeck and Ochs give us a somewhat Wittgensteinian reading of what communities of interpretation are all about, and both assume that there are pragmatic rules, emergent from dialogue, that help shape communal life.

Yet Ochs wishes to avoid the charge of relativism that the Lindbeck-style move sometimes brings upon itself. Pragmatism can allow for truths in context that are more than mere “as-if” structures of posited intelligibility. Ochs presents his case quite clearly on this issue: “... pragmatic proofs complement a pluralistic but non-relativistic notion of truth. The pragmatic notion of validity is pluralistic, since different communities may diagram indubitable beliefs in different ways. The pragmatic notion of plausibility is non-relativistic, since there are general standards of plain-sense reading. The pragmatic notion of strength is non-relative, since there are generally recognizable symptoms of failed practice, but it is also pluralistic, since different communities will define the conditions of failure differently” (276).

Two points are especially relevant here; that of the plain-sense reading (Peirce’s “critical common sensism”) and that of the notion of a failed reading. Failed readings are ones that thwart the common sense practices of a community and will be clearly manifest in their brute secondness (Peirce’s category of pre-intelligible conflict). A reading (or writing) that lacks thirdness (Peirce’s category of concrete reasonableness) will fall apart into secondness alone and will tear into the fabric of the community, while a successful strategy that lifts up thirdness will enable the community to find its own healing energies.
Thirdness, again, the category that points to concepts that are universal while also being concrete, emerges through self-correction and dialogue. “For the common-sense pragmatist, a belief is rational if it can diagram-and-correct other, problematic beliefs; Peirce’s account will not, therefore, display this rationality a priori, but only through the philosophic practice that is informed by his indubitable beliefs” (268). But, unlike Descartes’ notion of the indubitable, Peirce’s indubitable beliefs are ontologically and epistemologically vague, hence always requiring communal analysis and critique.

In sum, what Ochs gives us in this brilliant and detailed study is a Peirce who is open to both the general and the vague, embedded in a kind of scriptural, even rabbinic, practice that diagrams arguments and conceptual positions so that they can enhance the life of given communities and a Peirce who moved past his own critique of modernism into a semiotic and logical world in which there is still the possibility for truth claims in a pluralistic but not relativistic world. This is not a Peirce who many would immediately recognize, but it is a Peirce who is surely there in his own practices, if not always in his own categorial structure.

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Most scholars and practitioners of psychology or religion are aware of the mutual ignorance and antipathy often expressed between the two fields. Professionals in both domains often view them as competing systems with incompatible goals and understandings of humanity. However, with increasing momentum scholars and practitioners have called for and engaged in research that integrates and respects both domains. This work often both decries the lack of work combining psychology and religion and notes the need for a more sophisticated and useful framework for thinking about psychology and religion. Kenneth Pargament’s book addresses these concerns. First, it documents and evaluates a wealth of relevant research. Second, it organizes and analyses this work from a coherent and compelling perspective.

Pargament’s focus is the role of religion in coping. He notes that this is an area of clear intersection between psychology and religion. “Religions of the world have a deep appreciation for the often painful nature of the human condition. Even more important though, religious traditions articulate their visions of how we should respond to this condition” (3). This focus allows for a clearer and deeper dialogue between religious and psychological viewpoints than is possible in broad surveys. Further, this is not merely an arid exercise in integrating two fields. It delves into the substance of coping. It addresses psychology and religion in a context that is meaningful for those concerned with the problems and issues of everyday living instead of philosophical ramifications of putatively competing world views. Foremost, this is a text that will be useful to those interested in reli-